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1. Introduction
The Climate Assessment for the Southwest (CLIMAS)
project is an interdisciplinary study drawing upon the
expertise of hydrologists, climatologists and social sci-
entists to examine the impacts of climatic variability
upon water users in the Southwestern United States.
Funded by a grant from the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA), the project seeks
to provide decision-makers and stakeholders with bet-
ter access to and understanding of climate forecasting
products, and also to provide those who produce cli-
mate predictions with insight into what kinds of infor-
mation may be most useful.
This paper reflects work carried out under the Urban
Water Study component of the CLIMAS project. The
Urban Water Study, to date, has encompassed the
Phoenix, Tucson and Santa Cruz Active Management
Areas1, as well as the Benson and Sierra Vista
subwatersheds (Figure 1). Studies of these areas have
included a sensitivity analysis of the potential impacts
of severe sustained drought on selected urban commu-
nities in Arizona, an assessment of potential vulnerabil-
ity of urban water providers in Arizona to climate im-
pacts, and an institutional analysis that focuses on the
capacity of existing laws, regulations, and decision-
making practices to respond effectively to climatic
stresses.
This paper is one of a series of publications addressing
climate impacts on water resources in the U.S. South-
Abstract
Any assessment of climate impacts on water resources must take into account the legal and institutional structure
within which decision making is framed. This document provides a summary of international, federal, state, and
local laws and policies that may facilitate or constrain decision making within the context of climate impacts. The
evaluation concludes that Arizona has a reasonably well-developed structure for governing water management in
the more stringently managed areas of the state. This structure provides a basis for balancing climatic and ecologi-
cal factors with human stresses, especially rapid population growth, on the state’s environment and natural re-
source base. However, there is a need to take climate more fully into account in policy making and implementa-
tion. Among the greatest needs is to develop a comprehensive drought contingency plan that recognizes the
possibility of droughts at least of the magnitude of the decadal-scale drought of the 1950s. The plan should be
statewide, but should also take care to address issues of local vulnerability and equity. A sharper emphasis also
needs to be placed on public education about not only water management issues, but also about the nature of cli-
mate variability in the region and the kinds of impacts on water supply and demand that residents should take
into consideration when making and carrying out their plans. Pressures on water management structures and pro-
cesses are likely to escalate in the future; these pressures will certainly be exacerbated under conditions of climatic
stress, particularly deep, extended drought. Climate information, if effectively disseminated and used, has the po-
tential to contribute to effective management decisions.
west. The aim of this working paper is to provide an
overview of the climate implications associated with se-
lected international, national, and state legal arrange-
ments that strongly influence water management op-
tions in Arizona’s urban centers. The topic is particularly
salient today, with urban populations and economic
development increasing rapidly throughout the region
at the same time that local and regional capacity to de-
velop additional water resources is becoming ever more
Figure 1. Active Management Areas and San Pedro River
Subwatersheds
Source: Arizona Department of Water Resources, 1999
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challenging. Concurrent advances in understanding
past climatic conditions and patterns, as well as in cli-
mate forecasting at seasonal, annual, decadal and
longer time scales, present opportunities for develop-
ment of a more integrated knowledge base to be used
in decision making. Yet efforts to operationalize new
knowledge are seldom straightforward, due to con-
straints posed by existing value systems, economic and
political structures, and institutional frameworks. The
following narrative highlights some of the pivotal
points where existing institutional arrangements may
facilitate or impede such efforts.
2. Water in the Southwest—The
Context
The semiarid Southwest lacks abundant surface water
sources, and groundwater resources are unevenly dis-
tributed, with some areas having large volumes of
groundwater and some having very little. Rights to
surface water are fully allocated, and in urban areas
such as Phoenix and Tucson, groundwater withdrawals
are closely regulated. Arizona water withdrawals top 7
million acrefeet (maf ) a year and consumptive use is in
the range of 5 maf; by comparison New Mexico’s with-
drawals are in the neighborhood of 4 maf per year,
with more than 2.4 maf classified as consumptive use.
In fast-growing areas such as Albuquerque and Santa
Fe, New Mexico, and Flagstaff, Sierra Vista, Prescott,
Phoenix, and Tucson, Arizona, population growth and
related increases in water demand have drawn atten-
tion to the need to reprioritize water use to more effec-
tively reflect highest and best uses. How to prioritize
among competing uses remains contested, however, es-
pecially with regard to establishing an acceptable rela-
tive value for agricultural water use and for in-stream
and ecosystem support. In the Tucson and Phoenix ar-
eas, urban growth poses a serious challenge to agricul-
tural activity, with residential subdivisions and other
urban land uses replacing cotton, citrus, and other
crops. Yet, as will be discussed in more detail below,
groundwater law in Arizona continues to emphasize
agricultural water rights in important ways. Likewise,
existing and potential institutional arrangements that
allocate substantial water supplies to adjacent Indian
reservation lands present challenges to sustainable wa-
ter management in both cities. Certain kinds of cli-
mate impacts such as extended drought, when com-
bined with high growth rates and these sorts of
institutional arrangements, hold the potential to seri-
ously challenge “business-as-usual” water management
in Arizona.
At the same time, although substantial information
about the utility of various management mechanisms
already exists, little work has been done in the region
on the nature and probable severity of climate impacts
on water management, or on how to incorporate infor-
mation about climate variability and change into insti-
tutional structures and management practices. Pro-
longed and/or severe climatic stress, especially drought,
will require state and local water management entities
to identify effective ways to meet higher water de-
mands in the face of decreased water supplies. This
must be done in a matter that is politically acceptable
to municipal, industrial, commercial, residential, and
agricultural users as well as to environmental interests
concerned about protecting in-stream flows and eco-
system vitality. This analysis is a preliminary effort to
fill a specific gap in the literature on climate change
impacts: how federal, state and local policies and insti-
tutions may buffer or exacerbate the effects of climatic
variability on urban water supply, demand and quality
in Arizona.
In arid regions such as the Southwestern United States,
conflicts over scarce water resources have a long his-
tory. In order to efficiently utilize this precious re-
source in a sustainable manner, a complex set of water
physical structures—including dams, reservoirs, and
interconnected groundwater pumping and delivery
systems—have been built. Likewise, over the years, an
increasingly complex institutional structure has
emerged at scales from the international to the local to
mediate competition over water allocation and use. To
a great extent, the response of an individual water sys-
tem to increased climate variability is shaped by factors
such as the types of water available (e.g., surface water,
renewable groundwater, fossil groundwater, reclaimed
water), the hydrological and geological characteristics
of the source area, the area’s population and economic
profiles, and existing water management policies.
As the Arizona Department of Water Resources
(ADWR) notes in its Third Management Plan for the
Phoenix Active Management Area, “The key to effec-
tive water management is to anticipate change and to
develop systems flexible enough to respond to condi-
tions unlike those experienced today” (ADWR 1999a:
12-10). However, the primary “change” referred to by
the Department of Water Resources is population
growth; the “conditions unlike those experienced to-
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day” principally involve more water users exerting
greater pressure on existing water resources. In the
Southwest, rapid population growth is a key factor that
must be incorporated into any serious consideration of
the utility of current water management policies in
coping with climate impacts. Projections by the Ari-
zona Department of Economic Security indicate that
both the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas will
grow by about 40 percent by 2025 (ADES 1999). The
vast majority of the state’s population is already urban-
ized, and expectations are that most additional popula-
tion growth will occur in municipalities.
The analysis that follows begins with a key underlying
doctrine of western water law, that of prior appropria-
tion. The focus is then trained on laws and policies re-
lated to management of the Colorado River, the pri-
mary source of water for millions of water users in a
substantial portion of the western United States.2 Fed-
eral regulations, including federal reserve rights and the
Endangered Species Act, are explored, followed by a
more in-depth examination of key Arizona institutions,
including the Central Arizona Project and the Ground-
water Management Act. The analysis concludes with ex-
amples of climate-related water management issues im-
portant to the Phoenix and Tucson areas, and a
summary of outstanding issues that, if addressed, could
enhance institutional capacity to cope with the impacts
of climate variability on Arizona’s water resources.
3. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
The Right of Prior Appropriation underpins Arizona
(and most Western) water law (Sax et al. 1991: 10). In
the western United States, long-standing water rights
were typically established to apply to the entire
amount of water a user can put to “beneficial use;”
however, to achieve beneficial use it is usually only
necessary to divert the water from its source, regardless
of the economic or social value to which it is then ap-
plied. A corollary to this rule is “use it or lose it,”
meaning that any water not put to beneficial use (di-
verted) for an extended period of time may be claimed
by another appropriator (Sax et al. 1991: 137).
Under prior appropriation, senior rights holders are
entitled to the full amount of water that is legally
theirs, before junior rights holders receive even a por-
tion of their allocations; hence the phrase “first in
time, first in right” (Sax et al. 1991: 138). In times of
extreme heat and dryness, there is less return flow from
crops due to higher evaporation and higher plant use
of water. This can have disastrous effects on junior
rights holders (Tarlock 1991). Reduced return flows
can also cause downstream municipal estimates of wa-
ter availability to be inaccurate by a large percentage.
Many large irrigators have extra storage and other
means of cushioning themselves against drought. Mu-
nicipal users, in recent years, have been able to acquire
access to other water sources. Thus, when water deliv-
eries are reduced or stopped according to a priority
schedule, the users most negatively affected tend to be
small farmers, Indian tribes, and fish and wildlife.
Prior appropriation may prove to be an untenable basis
for the type of highly flexible water policy system that
would be required to best address the risks posed by
climate variability. As Tarlock notes with regard to the
potential implications of global climate change, “The
issue that prior appropriation poses for global warming
adjustment strategies is how flexible the system will be
in shifting water to areas of greatest need and in pro-
moting maximum access to a scarce resource” (1991:
243). The same may be said for the challenges posed
by natural climate variability.
The beneficial use doctrine does not require economic
considerations; rights and the risks of shortages are al-
located only on the basis of the date that the water
right was acquired. Often, the highest priority water
users are agricultural interests who may represent a
small proportion of total economic or social value, and
who employ far fewer people than industrial or mu-
nicipal interests. The result is that under prior appro-
priation in some cases, a great deal of water may be
used to grow surplus or low-value crops (Glennon
1990). Historically, considerable amounts of water
used for irrigation have been wasted through ineffi-
cient delivery technologies and excessive application of
water; today, however, new techniques are improving
efficiency both in terms of delivery and amount used
(Daniel 1995).
Agricultural water users have greater flexibility to curtail
their water use than do “demand hardened” municipal
and industrial users. By contrast, industrial and munici-
pal users are generally deemed to be putting water to
higher-value uses. These entities are more likely to have
resources at their disposal to pay the cost of pursuing ad-
ditional water rights and expanding or improving their
infrastructure.  The saved water could, with proper insti-
tutional arrangements, be made available to the munici-
pal and industrial sectors to cover shortages.
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Under Arizona law, water rights holders often do not
have the flexibility to lease or trade their water rights
to municipal or industrial sectors, a potentially serious
barrier in times of climatic stress. The “use it or lose it”
premise of prior appropriation doctrine is based on the
requirement to continue demonstrating beneficial use
of the allocated water. This, understandably, prompts
serious concern among rights holders that, if they
make the water available to other higher-value users
even during severe drought situations, they may lose
their right to that water in the future. The conundrum
introduces a high level of uncertainty into the practice
of managing water under conditions of climatic stress.
Yet any structural change in prior appropriation doc-
trine is likely to meet with stiff resistance and/or hard
bargaining on the part of rights holders. A significant
level of political will would be required to effect
changes; however, a severe drought of 10 years’ or
longer duration might provide the necessary context
for modifying prior appropriation law.
Economists have long criticized western water law be-
cause it ignores higher, alternative values of water
(Glennon 1990; Graff and Yardas 1998). Tarlock
(1991) suggests that water marketing could become
the cornerstone of a more adaptive water management
strategy, which would allow greater efficiency and flex-
ibility in managing water resources, as would likely be-
come necessary in coping with the impacts of climatic
variability and change. Miller (1997) recommends ex-
panding the ability to temporarily transfer small blocks
of water between individual and municipal users as a
way of coping with severe drought. However, prior ap-
propriation appears to be a stumbling block to the fur-
ther development of water marketing and water trans-
fers. Modifications to this doctrine would be necessary
to remove the obstacles that stand in the way of improv-
ing efficiency in allocating water resources and facilitat-
ing water transfers, both under normal and drought
conditions (Sax et al. 1991: 213; Frederick 1991).
Many of the obstacles to more economically efficient
allocation of water resources are non-economic, and
thus must be valued using alternative criteria. A 1989
study by Oggins and Ingram of 317 community lead-
ers in 12 regions of Arizona, New Mexico and West
Texas, including Arizona communities of Phoenix,
Tucson, as well as La Paz County and Marana/Avra
Valley, illustrates this point. Nearly all of the commu-
nities surveyed agreed that rural areas face losses from
water transfers that cannot be monetarily compen-
sated. These perceived losses include loss of control
over the region’s future; reduced economic opportu-
nity; losses to wildlife, natural areas and recreational
amenities; losses to security; losses to the local tax base;
and losses from the effects of retiring farmland for its
water rights (Oggins and Ingram 1990). As noted
above, reconciling potential contests is likely to require
careful consideration of prior appropriation rules, in
the contexts of equity and the value of water to the
competing users.
4. Regulation and Management of the
Colorado River System
As one of the Lower Basin states, Arizona has a strong
vested interest in the management of the Colorado
River. The following narrative highlights some of the
legal arrangements that must be taken into account
when considering the relationship between climate and
water management in Arizona.
4.1. Accords Between the United States and Mexico
There are two specific accords between the United
States and Mexico that have significant implications
for managing water resources under conditions of cli-
mate variability. The first is the Mexican Water Treaty;
the second is Minute 242 of the International Bound-
ary and Water Commission (IBWC).
4.1.1 The Mexican Water Treaty
Mexico was allotted 1.5 maf of Colorado River water
under the Mexican Water Treaty, which was ratified in
1944. This treaty also deals with issues relating to the
Rio Grande (called the Rio Bravo in Mexico) and
Tijuana Rivers (Sax et al. 1991: 793). Under the treaty,
during severe droughts, the United States may reduce its
allotment to Mexico “in the same proportion as con-
sumptive uses in the United States are reduced”3 (section
III, art.10, para. B). However, drought conditions have
never triggered this provision. It is unclear whether, in
the event of a severe sustained drought, obligations un-
der the Mexican Treaty would take precedence over allo-
cation to priority rights holders in the United States. On
the one hand, these parties have present perfected rights
to their allocations; on the other hand, the federal gov-
ernment would be under intense pressure to meet its ob-
ligations under the international treaty. Under this
treaty, fulfilling the delivery requirement to Mexico
would take precedence over meeting Arizona’s fourth-
level priority for its Central Arizona Project (CAP) al-
location of Colorado River water. As discussed later in
this working paper, loss of CAP water, combined with
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extended severe drought conditions would pose serious
challenges to management of water supplies, particu-
larly in the Phoenix and Tucson areas.
Ultimately, all decision-making power regarding Colo-
rado River allotments lies with the Secretary of the In-
terior, who must balance the river’s importance in gen-
erating electricity with water rights issues. One set of
studies has suggested that, in a severe sustained
drought involving extremely high temperatures, the
demand for electricity could increase such that releas-
ing water from Glen Canyon dam would become a
higher priority. This would in turn exacerbate pressure
on Upper Basin states to provide adequate flows. Once
these potentially greater-than-normal amounts of wa-
ter have passed through Glen Canyon, they would be
available to Lower Basin states, and possibly Mexico.
Under such conditions, the impacts on Mexico and the
Lower Basin could potentially be much smaller than
those felt in the Upper Basin (Harding et al. 1995).
4.1.2. Minute 242
The Mexican Water Treaty stipulates that Mexico may
receive an additional 0.2 maf of Colorado River water
in years when a surplus is available (1944 Treaty, sec-
tion III, article 10). When the treaty was ratified, how-
ever, there was no stipulation that the water had to be
of usable quality. This omission resulted in delivery of
highly saline and polluted water, derived from return
flows generated by agricultural operations that fed into
the Wellton Mohawk Canal in southwestern Arizona
(Gantz 1972). Not surprisingly, Mexico objected
strenuously, eventually resulting in a 1973 international
agreement formalized in Minute 242 of the Interna-
tional Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) and
its Mexican counterpart, the Comisión Internacional
de Límites y Agua (CILA). The Minute obligates the
United States to deliver Colorado River water at a
stipulated minimal quality level to Mexico. Agribusiness
in the Mexicali Valley and other areas of Baja Califor-
nia now utilizes approximately 1.1 maf of Mexico’s al-
lotment. As a result, very little of the river’s flow nor-
mally reaches the Colorado River delta and the Gulf of
California; in dry years no water reaches the delta at all
(see, e.g., Postel et al. 1998).
Overall availability of surplus flows to Mexico is likely
to become a rarer occurrence in the coming years as
population growth in the Upper and Lower Basins
leads to consumption of a greater proportion of the to-
tal river flow. At the same time, high levels of precipi-
tation, often but not always associated with El Niño
conditions, have resulted in as much as 10 maf being
discharged into the Gulf of California. Although re-
cent high-flow events have restored some of its vegeta-
tion, the Delta’s once rich estuarine ecosystem contin-
ues to be heavily affected by salt and pollution residues
deposited before Minute 242 was enacted, and even
now continues to be polluted by pesticides and fertiliz-
ers applied to fields within the Mexican portion of the
watershed. Rising salinity has decimated the estuarine
nurseries of many species of economic importance to
fishermen (Furnish and Ladman 1975). Severe sustained
droughts such as the 20-year drought of the late 1500s
and the 10-year drought of the 1950s would likely exac-
erbate these problems. Likewise, any change toward in-
creases in the frequency or magnitudes of flood events
could have potentially serious ramifications for the area.
Environmental groups have called for action to restore
the Colorado’s flow through the Delta, and a biosphere
preserve has been established in the Upper Gulf. Better
access to and use of a broader range of climate informa-
tion as well as of seasonal and longer-scale climate fore-
casts could contribute significantly to achieving the goal
of preserving the Delta and its ecosystems.
4.2. The Law of the River
The shortcomings of prior appropriation are evident
on a regional scale in the rules governing the use of
Colorado River water. More than 17 million people
and more than one million acres of farmland in Ari-
zona, California and Nevada receive water from the
Colorado River (ADWR 1999b). Arizona’s largest mu-
nicipal areas, Phoenix and Tucson, as well as dozens of
Indian tribes and countless other direct users, depend
on the Colorado River for at least part of their water
supply. The Law of the River dictates each state’s allot-
ment and level of priority to the Colorado River water.
It is a composite of state and federal laws and regula-
tions, court decisions, and international treaties, the
most pertinent of which are discussed below.
4.2.1. The Colorado River Compact
The Colorado River Compact was signed in 1922 to ap-
portion water between the Upper Basin states (Wyo-
ming, Colorado, Utah and New Mexico) and the Lower
Basin states (Arizona, Nevada and California) of the
Colorado River Basin (Figure 2). Each basin was to get
7.5 maf per year, with Lower Basin states receiving 1
maf more when the water supply was sufficient (Sax et
al. 1991: 703). The Colorado River was drastically over-
allotted in the original Colorado River Compact. The
16.4 maf flow at Lees Ferry that the Colorado Compact
allocations were based upon was later found to be the
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highest flow in the past 500 years (MacDonnell et al.
1995). Tree-ring records indicate that flows vary from
4.4 maf to over 22 maf, with the average being about
13.5 maf (Meko, et al. 1995; Tarboton 1995). Such
high levels of past hydrologic variability strongly sug-
gest that decision making should rely on a broader
range of climatic extremes. Assessments of potential
future impacts of climate variability and change on
the Colorado River Basin (Nash and Gleick 1993,
Gleick and Chelecki 1999) provide a further argu-
ment for integrating climate information and fore-
casts at all scales from monthly to centennial into
long-range planning.
4.2.2. The Boulder Canyon Project Act and Arizona v.
California
The Boulder Canyon Project Act, enacted in 1928,
further divided the Lower Basin’s allotment, with 4.4
maf going to California, 2.8 to Arizona, and 0.3 maf
to Nevada, with Arizona and California agreeing to
split any excess equally. California, Arizona and Ne-
vada were to equally share in any shortage. The Act
also authorized construction of Hoover Dam and the
All-American Canal (Sax et al. 1991). In 1963, the sys-
tem of priority rights to Colorado River water in times
of shortage was clarified and water was apportioned to
the Central Arizona Project (discussed in more detail
later in this working paper).
Tensions in the Lower Basin over access to Colorado
River water led to litigation, and issuance of the rul-
ings published under Arizona v. California (373 U.S.
546, 1964). The rulings specify the quantity of water
to which each of the Lower Basin states is entitled, and
gives specifics for how water is to be divided under
conditions of shortage. The ruling also sets the opera-
tional priorities to be followed in managing the river as
follows: (1) regulation of the river, improvement of
navigation, and flood control; (2) irrigation and do-
mestic uses, which include satisfaction of present per-
fected rights; and (3) power generation.
Laws and rulings notwithstanding, California has con-
tinued to exceed its 4.4 maf allotment of Colorado
River water in recent years by as much as 1.1 maf.
California has been able to regularly exceed its right to
Colorado River water in large part because the Upper
Basin states have not yet seen their water demand rise
to levels that require full diversion of their entire allo-
cations; thus more water has remained in the river for
downstream use. Recently, however, California, Ne-
vada, and Arizona have negotiated an agreement
whereby California’s over-appropriation will cease in
future years, in order to free up water needed to meet
the legal allocations of the other two Lower Basin
states (these issues are discussed in a later section). Ne-
vada, for example, expects its water demand to exceed
available supplies by 2015, and expects to not only
appropriate its full Colorado allotment but also to
develop new water supplies (Yozwiak 1997). Arizona
only began using its full 2.8 maf apportionment in
2000, largely through newly institutionalized water
banking arrangements (see the Water Banking section
of this working paper).
The 7.5 maf annually of water that the Upper Basin
provides to the Lower Basin is based on a 10-year roll-
ing average. In other words, in dry years, the Upper
Basin does not have to meet its entire obligation, as
long as the amount is made up over the 10-year period.
Section 301(b) of the Colorado River Basin Project
Act dictates that the Secretary of the Interior ensure
that non-CAP Arizona, California and Nevada receive
their full allocations first; other rights holders in Cali-
fornia are next in line. Contract holders and federal
reservations in Arizona and Nevada have third priority
for meeting their allocations. It is only after all of these
obligations are met in full that Arizona receives its
CAP allocation (MacDonnell et al. 1995).
Figure 2. Colorado River Basin
Source: U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
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Miller (1997) identifies the negotiation of agreements
based on inadequate information (such as the Colo-
rado River Compact) as a serious problem in coping
with future uncertainty. The large volume of storage
capacity on the Colorado River (discussed in a later
section of this working paper) provides a substantial
buffer against the impacts of water shortage on the
Lower Basin states, including Arizona. However, as
modeling of the potential impacts of the 20-year severe
sustained drought of the late 1500s revealed,
Lake Powell and other major Upper Basin res-
ervoirs would be emptied, and Lake Mead
nearly so, after two decades of severely re-
duced runoffs. Water deliveries for consump-
tive uses in the Upper Basin would fall to
about half of normal levels, albeit for only a
few years. Consumptive uses in the Lower Ba-
sin would be largely unaffected, save for those
served by the Central Arizona Project (Lord et
al. 1995, p. 490; emphasis in original).
According to model results by Harding et al. (1995),
while Lake Powell would be essentially drained, Lake
Mead would continue to store nearly 7.5 maf of water
that would be available for use in the Lower Basin
states. Importantly, the Lower Basin states would only
see a 3 percent shortfall in their allotments during the
worst drought year. However, the cumulative impacts
of reduced deliveries would certainly trigger actions
such as implementation of stricter conservation mea-
sures and water rate hikes. In addition, if political pres-
sure for supply augmentation—particularly from pow-
erful urban interests—were to arise, pursuit of new
interbasin water transfers might be anticipated (a dis-
cussion of interbasin transfers in Arizona is provided in
a later section).
Exploration of alternative interstate institutional rules,4
as well as changes in water allocation and management
rules within the individual states suggested that allow-
ing more water to be stored high in the Upper Basin,
where evaporation losses are less, and engaging intrast-
ate and interstate water banking and water marketing
were particularly effective strategies. Water banking
and marketing strategies were determined to be par-
ticularly useful for enabling Arizona to better manage
its CAP allocation (Henderson and Lord 1995). Inter-
estingly, the research indicated that “Changes in intra-
state water allocation and management were more ef-
fective in mitigating drought damages than were …
changes in the Law of the River…” (Lord et al. 1995,
p. 941). The authors note,
Our studies suggest that institutions which
possess (1) sufficiently broad responsibility
and authority to deal with all interrelated
problems, (2) provide for appropriate repre-
sentation and participation of all major af-
fected interests, (3) generate and distribute ob-
jective and technically sound information, and
(4) facilitate communication and bargaining
between states are most likely to adopt and
implement operating rules which resolve con-
flict and achieve efficient and equitable resource
allocation. The single federal administrator
model which is predominant in the complex of
existing collective choice institutions in the
Colorado River Basin largely fails to meet these
criteria (Lord et al. 1995, p. 941).
The authors of the study conclude that non-consump-
tive uses, including hydropower, of waters of the Colo-
rado River system are highly vulnerable to drought un-
der existing institutional arrangements. This is
particularly true for the Lower Basin. By contrast, con-
sumptive water uses in the Lower Basin States are gen-
erally well protected from drought impacts, although
chronic water shortages would likely be experienced
(Lord et al. 1995). These findings reinforce the need to
improve water management institutions in order to in-
crease adaptive capacity and overall resilience to cli-
mate impacts on non-consumptive as well as con-
sumptive uses.
4.3. The Colorado River Reservoir System
The Colorado River reservoir system is structured
around a series of dams on the mainstem and tributar-
ies of the river in both the Upper and Lower Basin. Ac-
counting for Colorado River flows and reservoir stor-
age is complicated by the fact that designation of
normal, shortage or flood conditions is determined by
not just how much water is in the Colorado River, but
the water levels in Lake Mead, projected inflow into
the reservoir, status of the 10-year rolling average of
deliveries from the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin at
Lake Powell, and current demand (AWBA Commis-
sion 1998; MacDonnell et al. 1995). Thus the se-
quence of wet and dry years can be as important in de-
termining the state’s water status as the actual amount
of rain that has fallen.
The large amount of reservoir space allows Arizona
greater latitude in coping with climate impacts on its
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Colorado River water supplies (see Miller 1997). A
change in frequency, over relatively short terms, of ex-
treme climatic conditions and related fluctuations in
river flows would be unlikely to adversely affect
Arizona’s share of Colorado River water supplies. How-
ever, a longer-term trend towards warmer and drier
conditions throughout the Upper and Lower Basins
could have significant impacts. For example, in an av-
erage year, approximately 1.5 maf of the Colorado’s
flow evaporates from Lakes Powell and Mead, an
amount that would certainly increase under conditions
of higher temperatures, as would likely occur in an ex-
tended drought. Further, as noted by Frederick (1991),
the rate of construction of new reservoirs has not kept
pace with population growth; nor is it likely to in the
future, for several reasons. For one, the most feasible
reservoir sites have already been developed. Investing
the funds necessary to expand storage capacity only in-
creases the probability of being able to supply water at
a diminishing rate of returns. Furthermore, in addition
to rising construction costs, the opportunity costs of
storing and diverting water also have also risen consid-
erably as more members of society place higher values
on in-stream flows. This appears to be a problem not
only for water providers relying on water stored in
large reservoirs, but also for providers who rely on
smaller storage systems that cannot easily or economi-
cally be expanded to meet the demands of a growing
population coupled with more variable climatic condi-
tions. This issue will be further explored in the sections
on issues within specific AMAs.
4.3.1. Policies and Operating Criteria—Upper and
Lower Colorado Basins
The actual amount of water to be made available to
Arizona and the other Compact states each year lies
within the purview of the Secretary of the Interior, and
that of the U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of
Reclamation (see Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range
Operation of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to
the Colorado River Basin Project Act of September 30,
1968). The Secretary transmits the Annual Operating
Plan, which stipulates how the Colorado River System
will be managed over that year, to the Governors of the
Basin States, as stipulated in the Colorado River Basin
Project Act (43 U.S.C. § 1552(b).
In essence, the amount of water that flows down the
river in any given year from Glen Canyon Dam and
Hoover Dam is based on the amount of water already
in storage, anticipated releases for various uses such as
hydroelectric power generation, and the need to equal-
ize storage behind the two dams. When the amount of
water available exceeds the total of all quantified Lower
Basin rights, and there is no need for flood control
measures, the Secretary, in his/her role as Watermaster,
may declare a “surplus” on the river. Under these con-
ditions, each of the Lower Basin states may increase
their demand by the following maximum percentages:
California, 50 percent; Arizona, 46 percent; Nevada, 4
percent. Any excess beyond these proportions flows as
surplus to Mexico. Since Mexico has the capacity to
use only 0.2 maf above their allotted 1.5 maf today, ex-
cess water above 1.7 maf flows into the Gulf of Mexico
(see Pagano et al. 1999).
The agency responsible for operating the river’s infra-
structure to meet the above rules is the Lower Colorado
Bureau of Reclamation (LC-BOR). This agency oper-
ates the eight dams on the Lower Colorado River, in-
cluding Hoover Dam. Lake Mead, behind Hoover
Dam, has by far the greatest storage capacity of the eight
dams (approximately 27.3 maf). The Upper Colorado
BOR operates Glen Canyon Dam, in addition to other
reservoirs higher up in the basin. Lake Powell, behind
Glen Canyon Dam, has a capacity of some 24.3 maf.
Together, Lakes Mead, Mohave, Havasu (all Lower-Ba-
sin reservoirs), and  Powell can store more than 4.5 years
of average inflow. As noted by Pagano et al. (1999),
“This ratio is exceptionally high when compared to
other basins within the United States” (p. 122).
Pagano et al. also noted that the management of the
Lower Basin is distinctly different from that of the Up-
per Basin. The Lower Basin is managed according to a
philosophy of strict adherence to inflexible rules, in no
small part due to continuing tensions among the three
Lower Basin States and because portions of the river
below Lake Mead are relatively heavily populated. The
Upper Basin agency, by contrast, has formally adopted
an adaptive management approach that emphasizes
monitoring the effects of management actions on the
environment, followed by adjustments to reflect the
findings of such monitoring. In the Upper Basin, hu-
man habitation is far less dense. Further, unlike Lake
Mead management practices, Lake Powell manage-
ment includes scheduling of high releases of water be-
fore the snow melt season, low releases during the melt
season, then a return to high releases after the melt sea-
son. According to Pagano et al., “The Upper Bureau
estimates that it can adjust for inaccuracies in [climate]
forecasts on the order of 1.5 maf per month. This ad-
justment of the timing of releases is one part of a so-
phisticated method of risk management...” (p. 124).
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Both bureaus use annual operating plans that predict
reservoir levels and monthly releases two years in ad-
vance. These plans are based on recent stream-flow
data, flood control criteria, hydrologic forecasts (water
supply outlooks issued by the NOAA River Forecast-
ing Center), equilibration of Lakes Mead and Powell,
and other factors such as need for system maintenance.
The operating plans are revised monthly as new water
supply outlooks are issued (Pagano et al. 1999). Skilled
climate forecasts have high potential for improving the
water supply outlooks used to determine management
of the river and, by extension, the capacity of water
providers and regulators to manage water supply and
demand more efficiently.
Climate variability clearly affects the operation of the
river system, but only recently have the system’s manag-
ers begun to take climate information and forecasts into
account in their decision process. The effects of the
strong El Niño of 1983 on Glen Canyon Dam may be
credited with beginning the process of thinking more
broadly about climate impacts, for intense precipitation
and consequent runoff brought Lake Powell to within a
few feet of the top of the dam. Emergency actions, in-
cluding opening all release valves and the two diversion
tunnels, averted disaster. By the time 1993 El Niño fore-
casting began, Upper Basin dam managers were pre-
pared to take the kinds of proactive measures needed to
ensure that the reservoir did not over-fill. Intensive, on-
going interactions between climate researchers and river
managers, currently underway, provide an opportunity
for integrating use of climate information into manage-
ment of the Colorado River system.
The Upper Basin management style, with its greater
latitude for flexible response to stresses such as those
posed by climate variability, has significant implica-
tions for Arizona and the other Lower Basin states. If
the forecasts used by river managers consistently fail to
reflect higher probabilities of exceptionally wet or dry
conditions over multiple years, water managers in the
Lower Basin States, including Arizona, may be misled
about the amount of water available. Given that CAP
allotments have junior priority, this situation should be
a matter of significant concern to water managers who
rely heavily on CAP supplies to meet customer demand.
5. Federal Regulations
Numerous federal regulations have implications for
management of water resources in Arizona. The laws
that are especially pertinent within the context of cli-
mate impacts are reviewed in this section.
5.1. Federal Reserved Water Rights on Native
American Land
Indian water rights claims pose a significant challenge
to long-term water management, nowhere more so
than in Arizona. Federal reserved water rights on Na-
tive American land were recognized after the 1908 Su-
preme Court case Winters v. United States. The Court
held that in setting aside reservations, Congress had
also intended to set aside sufficient water to satisfy In-
dians’ present and future needs (Sax et al. 1991: 809).
This was later interpreted in Arizona v. California to
mean that reservations where agriculture is a primary ac-
tivity are entitled to an amount of water sufficient to ir-
rigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage on a reserva-
tion, regardless of how much water a tribe was actually
using (Sax et al. 1991: 859). For five tribes along the
Colorado, their water needs were to be met through the
Lower Basin states’ apportionment. These tribes are
presently using 80 to 90 percent of their entitlement.
However, many other tribes have not yet had their
claims adjudicated. Resolution of these potentially very
large claims could have major impacts on water supplies
in the West. For example, the Navajo Nation has not yet
claimed its Colorado River rights, but could, theoreti-
cally, eventually claim up to 5 maf. Glennon and
Maddock (1994) discuss an example of the large poten-
tial impact of Native American water rights, related to
adjudication of the waters of the Gila River, a tributary
of the Colorado River and traditionally a major water
source for some of the local tribes. Adjudication began
in 1974, and has since been expanded to cover not only
the Gila itself, but also all tributaries and the river’s
source area. Claims have been filed by 24,000 parties; to
date, the adjudication has cost approximately $52 mil-
lion, and matters are still unresolved.
Federal reserve rights for Native American claims were
identified in a 1993 Office of Technology Assessment
report as having the potential to cause future conflicts
with other water users, if stream flows diminish. Many
tribes are currently in the process of adjudicating their
water rights. This is an essential step in making it pos-
sible to reallocate water rights in times of severe
drought (Miller 1997; Tarlock 1991). Also subject to
debate is the question of whether their allotment could
be sold out of state and, if so, what restrictions would
apply. The Bureau of Reclamation has proposed regu-
lations to address how Indians may lease their entitle-
ments for off-reservation purposes, with the idea that,
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“Allowing these transactions also promotes tribal eco-
nomic and governmental self-sufficiency on the part of
Indian tribes” (Garner and Ouellette 1995: 487).
Native American water rights issues are pertinent to
analysis of climate impacts on water resources in Ari-
zona for several reasons, including the fact that making
water available to settle Indian rights claims was part of
the impetus behind both the CAP canal and the Ari-
zona Water Banking Authority (Glennon 1995). De-
termination of these rights could affect CAP alloca-
tions and the amount of water available to be banked.
The origins of some of the Salt River Project water,
which Phoenix relies on for nearly 40 percent of its
supply (based on 1995 figures), are located on Indian
land and could be subject to prior appropriation. In
addition, Phoenix may eventually have to seek Gila In-
dian water supplies to meet its growing water demands
while at the same time staying in compliance with the
Arizona Groundwater Management Act (discussed
later in this working paper).
The Phoenix AMA’s Third Management Plan notes
that the largest Indian water rights claims affecting wa-
ter supplies within the AMA remain unsettled. This
means that many important water supply and demand
questions cannot yet be fully answered. The Plan also
notes the need for better coordination of water man-
agement across reservation boundaries and cites
groundwater pumping just outside of reservation
boundaries as having caused a drop in the water table
level within reservation boundaries. (ADWR 1999a:
12-3). Decisions in these cases are likely to have sig-
nificant impacts on some municipal water providers.
Thus, the lack of resolution of Native American claims
creates difficulties for urban planners trying to pin-
point what water supplies will be available from which
sources, and at what cost, in the future.
5.2. Federal Reserved Rights in Protected Areas
As public values increasingly turn towards the preser-
vation of wildlife habitat, in-stream water uses are
likely to become increasingly important in the state.
In-stream flow rights are often particularly vulnerable
during periods of water shortage because they are gen-
erally junior rights. Conflict already exists between
municipal and agricultural users and advocates of the
preservation of riparian habitats in several areas of Ari-
zona, for example along the San Pedro River in south-
eastern Arizona (see San Pedro Expert Study Team
1998). The San Pedro River originates in northern
Mexico and flows toward the north. A tributary of the
Gila River, which is, in turn, a tributary of the Colo-
rado River, the San Pedro is one of the few remaining
perennial streams remaining in southeastern Arizona.
Stream flow in the San Pedro is composed of base flow
and flood flows, generated by summer monsoon, win-
ter frontal, and tropical storm activities in the area.
In some stretches of the river, flows are perennial and a
high degree of stream-aquifer interaction occurs. The
hydrology of the river is complex, with some stretches
gaining water and others losing. In April 1999, Ameri-
can Rivers, an environmental organization, listed the
San Pedro as the fourth most endangered river in the
United States (American Rivers 1999).5 Concern re-
volves around water use by the nearby City of Sierra
Vista and Fort Huachuca Army Base, which lies adja-
cent to the city. Over-pumping by Sierra Vista and
Fort Huachuca of the regional aquifer was cited by
American Rivers as the primary threat to the San Pedro
River. The organization went on to predict that, at cur-
rent pumping rates, reaches of the San Pedro that cur-
rently have perennial flows will be dry for at least part
of the year by 2008. Climate variability poses further
challenges for management of this and other protected
areas in the Southwest, because research and decision
making are typically based on mean climate figures, or
at best on a limited range of climatic variability that
fails to recognize the full extent of potential climate
impacts. Inclusion of data reflecting periods ranging
from seasonal to multi-century is needed to fully as-
sess the potential range of impacts on such protected
areas.
5.2.1. Surface Water-Groundwater Conjunctive
Management
The San Pedro River provides a good example of one
of the thorniest problems associated with managing for
in-stream flows and riparian ecosystems. Congress des-
ignated the San Pedro Riparian National Conservation
Area (SPRNCA) in 1988 (Tellman et al. 1997), a des-
ignation that makes the area subject to federal reserve
water rights. Similar to the rules that govern Indian
water rights claims on reservations that were set aside
by the federal government, this designation indicates
that Congress also intended to set aside water rights
sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the land. However,
the exact implications are subject to judicial interpreta-
tion. Conflicts already exist in the vicinity of the San
Pedro River and in other areas of the Southwest be-
tween human uses and maintaining an aquifer at a
level high enough to continue feeding connected sur-
face water and riparian areas.
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The issue is particularly difficult in Arizona, because it
is one of only a few Western states that still have sepa-
rate groundwater and surface flow appropriations laws.
As Glennon and Maddock (1994) note, most states
now base their laws on contemporary scientific knowl-
edge of hydrological connections, a trend that Arizona
law has thus far been unwilling to acknowledge.
Arizona’s more arcane water law also fails to consider
the fact that the technology commonly used for
groundwater pumping has also changed significantly
since the laws were written. More powerful pumps
have a greater impact on groundwater levels, resulting
in more overdraft. The legal framework for water man-
agement, even today in Arizona, remains based on an
Arizona Supreme Court decision that rejected land-
owners’ rights of ownership of the groundwater under
their land, prior to its withdrawal from the aquifer (see
In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Gila River System and Source, Interlocutory Re-
view, Issue No. 2, 175 Ariz. 382, 857 P.2d 1236, 1993;
see also Glennon and Maddock 1994). This issue
could have significant bearing in times of extreme
drought, for under current law pumping of groundwa-
ter feeding streams and adjacent riparian areas could be
legally continued or increased to the point of depleting
any flows that might otherwise have supported the
instream and riparian areas, thus threatening any exist-
ing federal reserved rights.
5.3. The Endangered Species Act
Water management may also be affected by environ-
mental law, particularly the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). An Office of Technology Assessment report
(1993) noted that the ESA could be used to restrict the
future use and development of water supplies, and
would likely be affected by climate change. The ESA
requires federal departments and agencies to cooperate
with state and local agencies to identify and conserve
endangered species and their habitats. Habitat preser-
vation, as discussed in the San Pedro example above,
often requires reductions or modifications in water
use. It is conceivable that the viable habitat of many
species could be reduced to a fraction of their previous
range by more extreme climatic conditions. For ex-
ample, Snyder et al. (1997) examined what would hap-
pen to the San Pedro if increased groundwater pump-
ing caused the water table to decline. The researchers
found that a three-foot drop in the water table would
eliminate marshy species, while a six-foot drop would
prevent cottonwood and willow seedlings from sprout-
ing, meaning that most cottonwood and willows
would eventually loose out to mesquite and sacaton
grass. Even under existing climate conditions, if pump-
ing proceeds at the rate projected for the Sierra Vista
area, losses within the next 10 to 20 years could in-
clude 52 percent of the marsh vegetation, 42 percent
of cotton and willow seedlings, and 17 percent of the
mature cottonwood forest (Tellman et al. 1997). Such
a decline in vegetation could more easily cause the re-
maining riparian areas to be declared critical habitat
areas under the ESA. A requirement to do whatever is
required to preserve those areas, regardless of the eco-
nomic impact, could follow such a designation.
Glennon and Maddock (1994) describe a similar situa-
tion wherein a preliminary injunction was awarded to
the Sierra Club in a case involving over-pumping of
the Edwards Aquifer in central Texas; however, the in-
junction was later vacated.
The ESA also has bearing on the use of Colorado River
water, as well as on Indian rights claims (Hansen 1995).
When the Colorado River compact was created, envi-
ronmental impacts were not among the factors consid-
ered. The results have been devastating to native fish
species, and four species have been listed as endangered.
The massive dams that segment the Colorado block fish
passage, reduce spring flows, trap silt, and alter water
temperatures. Inner canyon beaches that fish need to
spawn have also been destroyed, and exotic fish have
been introduced. Pending lawsuits seeking to enforce
compliance with the ESA could have serious impacts on
the use of Colorado River water. The implications of cli-
mate variability for management under ESA rules could
be significant, for quantification of water needs typically
does not reflect the potential for severe sustained
drought, nor does it take into account shifts in the dis-
tribution of climatic norms and extremes.
Indian tribes who have not yet been able to use their
entire allocations hold many of the water rights to the
remaining undiverted in-stream flow in the West.
These rights constitute many of the best sources for
the water needed to maintain instream flows. Thus, it
is not surprising that conflict has arisen between tribes
requesting federal funding for the diversion projects
necessary for irrigation projects, and environmental in-
terests who wish to see in-stream flows preserved. Un-
fortunately, consideration of the impacts of climate vari-
ability, including floods as well as sustained droughts,
has not been effectively incorporated into decision pro-
cesses associated with these kinds of contests.
Miller (1997) suggested that managing in-stream water
rights would be easier in times of climatic stress if pub-
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lic agencies were allowed to represent in-stream inter-
ests in a market system, with a budget that would al-
low them to buy or rent water rights for environmental
purposes. The Office of Technology Assessment report
(1993) suggests that, instead of a single minimum flow
standard, a range of environmentally desirable flow
levels should be included in assessments of current and
projected water supplies. The lower of these various
flow levels would serve as a trigger point to tell water
authorities when to purchase water rights or imple-
ment restrictions of existing rights. Higher level flows
could trigger the establishment of new rights for use in
times of surplus.
5.4. Water Quality Provisions
The interaction between climatic variability, water
supply, and water quality is an important influence
on the nature of water demand and volume of water
available.
5.4.1. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act (CWA) was enacted by Congress
in 1972 to eliminate, by 1985, the discharge into the
nation’s waterways of pollutants, as well as to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation’s waters.” The Act allows enforce-
ment by citizen suits, provides for monitoring and
record keeping, and subjects violators to criminal pen-
alties and the loss of governmental funding. Under the
Act, however, administration of water quality standards
is left to the states, which are free to impose stricter con-
trols than required by federal effluent limitations. The
Third Management Plan for Phoenix (ADWR 1999a:
12-3) cites the need for closer coordination between Ari-
zona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ)
and ADWR, particularly regarding effluent reuse regula-
tions, remedial action projects for polluted or poor-qual-
ity groundwater, and ADEQ conservation requirement
exemptions of 65,000 af state-wide.
The most pertinent section of the CWA for climate
impacts analysis is Section 208, which provides for the
development of area-wide wastewater management
plans in areas that have been designated as having
waste treatment problems. Water quality issues are cer-
tain to come to the fore as enhanced use of effluent
supplies and increased utilization of municipal
graywater (non-sewage wastewater from homes and
businesses) become more prevalent. Generally drier
conditions would add additional incentives to the de-
velopment of these alternative water sources. Water
quality issues also link to flood events, which can lead
to contamination of water supplies through damage to
water and sewage mains, additional run-off to surface
water supplies, or flood-water penetration of wells. In-
creases in flood frequency or intensity due to changing
climatic conditions may hold serious implications for
sustaining water quality at regulatory levels.
5.4.2. Safe Drinking Water Act
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), passed in
1986, has implications for management under condi-
tions of climatic variability as well. The SDWA sets out
water quality regulations for water providers. In Ari-
zona, responsibility for enforcement of the SDWA lies
with the Arizona Corporation Commission.
It has been argued that Congress was wrong in passing
this legislation without taking into account the costs of
compliance for small water providers (80% of regu-
lated water systems in Arizona are categorized as
“small”). Indeed, most of the water providers that have
difficulties complying with the SDWA are small com-
panies that lack adequate funds to maintain properly
monitored distribution facilities. Further, in some bor-
der areas, such as Nogales, Arizona, flood waters from
Nogales, Sonora (in Mexico) sometimes carry chemical
contaminants and sewage into Arizona, threatening lo-
cal water supplies. An increase in flood frequency and/
or intensity could pose serious challenges to continued
compliance with the SDWA, as well as to the capacity
to fund necessary treatment of contaminated drinking
water sources.6
6. Arizona State Water Policies
Many provisions of the water management laws and
policies of the State of Arizona have potential implica-
tions for managing supply and demand under condi-
tions of climatic stress. An overview of some of the key
features of water supply and demand management are
discussed below.
6.1. The Central Arizona Project
The Central Arizona Project (CAP) (Figure 3) is a
335-mile long canal and series of pumping stations
and reservoirs that took nearly $4 billion and about 25
years to build (Glennon 1995). The canal begins in
Lake Havasu and proceeds southeast across Arizona,
eventually ending in Tucson. As previously discussed,
the canal is allotted 1.5 maf of Arizona’s 2.8 maf total
apportionment of Colorado River water, but is classi-
fied as fourth in line to Lower Basin allocations of wa-
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ter from the river. Under section 301(b) of the legisla-
tion authorizing the CAP system (Colorado River Ba-
sin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501-56, 1988), in
times of shortage the CAP will receive its 1.5 maf al-
lotment only after obligations to California, Nevada
and non-CAP Arizona are met (Sax 1991: 710;
Glennon 1995). As noted above, this makes the CAP
allotment among the most vulnerable of the Colorado
River allocations during times of drought. Due in part
to this vulnerability, both Phoenix and Tucson must
maintain the infrastructure to allow them to switch to
groundwater if the situation requires it.
The over-allotment of the Colorado River clearly con-
tributes to the tenuous nature of CAP supplies. The
Arizona Department of Water Resources notes in its
Third Management Plan for Phoenix that shortages are
to be expected on the Colorado River, on average, 30
percent of the time over the next 100 years, and 50
percent of the time by 2050 (ADWR 1999a: 12-6).
The Lower Basin has not been confronted with a se-
vere water shortage since the canal was built. However,
dependence on CAP supplies is anticipated to increase
substantially in the near future: Arizona’s Groundwater
Management Act (which will be discussed in greater
detail in a later section) mandates the greater use of re-
newable supplies such as CAP water and less depen-
dence on groundwater. Coupled with rapid population
growth throughout the Lower Basin, increased water
demand will likely put the CAP allocation in jeopardy,
at least some of the time.
Ironically, the larger problem, to
date, for Arizona has not been
too little CAP water, but rather
too much of it. Part of the pur-
pose of constructing the canal
was to enable Arizona to use a
greater proportion of its Colo-
rado River allotment, rather
than risk losing it to the water-
short states of California and
Nevada. However, declines in
the agricultural economy and
Tucson’s rejection of CAP water
in January 1995 constrained the
state from appropriating its full
allotment until the past year
(2000). The Arizona Water
Banking Authority (discussed in
more detail in the following sec-
tion) estimates that Arizona will
not have sufficient population and infrastructure to ef-
fectively use its entire allotment until 2030; currently,
much of the unused portion is being stored as a buffer
against future need. This is in sharp contrast to
California’s historical pattern of using some 1.1 maf
more than its 4.4 maf allotment. (Recently enacted In-
terim Surplus Guidelines, discussed in Section 6.2.2,
aim to reduce California’s reliance on volumes in excess
of its allotted share).
In addition, due in large part to Las Vegas’ explosive
growth, southern Nevada’s water needs will exceed the
state’s apportionment by 2015. Given these projec-
tions, the risk of diversion of unused portions of
Arizona’s allotment to other Lower Basin states may
again arise, particularly under conditions of severe cli-
matic stress. If this were to occur, there is no assurance
that the Supreme Court would once again favor Ari-
zona (Glennon 1995).
6.2. Water Banking, Surplus Water, and Transfers
The State of Arizona recognizes in its water laws and
policies the possibility that the availability of water will
vary from time to time, and, in particular, that serious
water shortages may occur. Such water shortages might
be caused by climatic conditions, or by interruptions
in deliveries due to system malfunctions or other un-
controllable events. Further, the State has expressed a
strong interest in assuring that it retains control of all
water rights it has been accorded under the Law of the
River. To these ends, the State has implemented the
Arizona Water Banking Authority, established a frame-
Figure 3. Map of the Central Arizona Project
Source: Central Arizona Project
V
e
rd
e
 R
iv
e
r
Salt River
Phoenix
C
o
lo
ra
d
o
 R
iv
e
r
Roosevelt
Lake
Salt River
Lake
Pleasant
S
a
n
ta
 C
ru
z R
ive
r
CAP Aqueduct
State Demonstration Recharge Project
Pumping Plant
Tucson
Direct Service Territory
Gila
 Riv
er Gila River
15
Arizona Water Law and Policy
work for allocating water supplies over a 15-year pe-
riod during which California is expected to reduce its
appropriation of Colorado River water to its allotted
4.4 maf, and set in place the conditions under which
water transfers may and may not be undertaken.
6.2.1. Arizona Water Banking Authority
The Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA) was
created in 1996 amidst concern about Arizona’s inability
to fully utilize its entire allotment of Colorado River wa-
ter. The AWBA estimated that before the state reached
levels of population and industrial growth commensu-
rate with utilizing Arizona’s full CAP allotment (not
projected to occur until 2030), about 14 maf of Colo-
rado River water would have to be forfeited (AWBA
Commission 1997; see also A.R.S. Chapter 14, Arizona
Water Banking Authority). Although California, Ne-
vada and the Bureau of Reclamation each proposed a
different version of a plan involving water transfers, Ari-
zona remained suspicious of any arrangement involving
selling or leasing its water rights to California or Ne-
vada, out of concern that its entitlement would be per-
manently reduced. This concern was a major factor be-
hind creation of the AWBA and a subsequent effort to
assure that California would not continue its pattern of
taking more than its 4.4 maf allotment each year.
AWBA has the authority to accumulate water rights
from underground water storage credits under
Arizona’s various replenishment statutes, Colorado
River water available through voluntary land fallowing,
and short-term contracts with the Central Arizona Wa-
ter Conservation District (CAWCD, the administra-
tive arm of the CAP system) for unused CAP water for
underground water storage.
The main idea of the Bank is to store unused (i.e., “ex-
cess”) CAP water in underground storage facilities un-
til it is needed. In addition to the political motivation
of enabling Arizona to hold on to its Colorado River
allocation, AWBA stores water for municipal and in-
dustrial users in Arizona as insurance against any po-
tential future water shortages, such as those produced
by drought or other causes. Officials also intend,
through AWBA, to facilitate leasing of a portion of
Arizona’s Colorado River water to Nevada and Califor-
nia during times of water stress; during these periods
Arizona would instead rely on water stored through
the Bank (AWBA Commission 1998).
Under A.R.S. 45-2401 and 45-2423, the AWBA may
administer and oversee water banking for individual
entities within Arizona through centralized banking
services. Long-term storage credits are distributed to
depositors by AWBA, as provided in A.R.S. 45-2457.
Further, Arizona entities may borrow long-term stor-
age credits in return for reasonable compensation to
AWBA. AWBA is permitted to store additional CAP
water, and effluent as well, once all available “excess”
CAP water has been stored or when “excess” CAP water
is not available to AWBA. In addition, AWBA can con-
tract with similar authorities in California and Nevada
to bank the two states’ unused Colorado River water,
provided that the contracting state is willing to pay for
the service. In return, the depositing state would be al-
lowed to draw a similar amount directly from the Colo-
rado River at a future time. Notably, the program ex-
plicitly does not involve sale of any future rights to
water, but only the specified quantity of unused water.
As indicated above, AWBA holds potential to expand
Arizona’s capacity to deal with hydrological stresses
through water transfers, as Miller (1997) recommends.
However, the Bank’s effectiveness has been challenged
on the grounds that it is merely an accounting device
through which “paper water” may be shuffled, with
little relation to the amount of “wet water” (actual wa-
ter) being stored (La Bianca 1998). While the intent is
certainly to store water underground in order to assure
firm supplies in the event of drought conditions, issues
remain with regard to the amount of water actually be-
ing recharged, the availability of infrastructure to move
the stored water to the locations where it is needed,
and the effectiveness of institutional arrangements for
moving the water from storage to provider pipelines.
Thus, to date, water “banking” continues to be most
effective in facilitating the exchange of water storage
credits for permission to maintain existing water man-
agement practices. Another potential problem, as
stated by Miller (1997), is that, at present, most water
transfers involve permanent transfers of large blocks of
water, and indeed, Arizona Water Bank transactions
are based on transfers at the state level for multi-year
periods of time. Little consideration is given to poten-
tial climatic fluctuations in these transfers, even
though climatic stress could prompt decisions to shift
quantities of water, especially from senior to junior us-
ers, during periods of low flows. It is unclear whether
AWBA could exhibit enough flexibility to allow for
these types of more limited and specific transfers.
6.2.2. Interim Surplus Guidelines: Colorado River Water
In Spring 2001, the Arizona State Legislature ratified,
and the Governor signed, a proposal of the governors
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of the Colorado River Basin states that calls for the
Secretary of the Interior to adopt interim surplus
guidelines designed to wean California from its use of
Colorado River water in excess of its 4.4 maf allotment
(SJR 1001, First Regular Session of the Arizona State
Legislature, 2001; for the governors’ Basin States Pro-
posal, see Federal Register, August 8, 2000, Vol. 65, No.
153, pp. 48531-48538). This resolution, which is
quite complex, has significant ties with the AWBA, for
it sets the framework for allocating and banking the
surplus water that Metropolitan Water District and
others in Southern California have been using for
many years. The resolution also has significant impli-
cations for incorporation of climate information and
forecasts into water planning and management, as dis-
cussed below.
The Resolution covers the period January 1, 2002
through December 31, 2016, and includes support for
a program adopted by contractors of Colorado River
water in California to reduce their dependence on that
water over the 15-year period. Further, the resolution
acknowledges that the program implementing interim
surplus guidelines adopted by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior is dependent on Arizona’s foregoing delivery of
some of the surplus water that would otherwise be le-
gally available based on the Arizona v. California deci-
sion. In exchange, California is expected to reduce its
orders for water and to provide insurance to Arizona
that California’s use of surplus water during the 15-
year period will not cause a shortage of Colorado River
water within Arizona either during or after that period.
If a shortage occurs during or after this period, the
Metropolitan District of Southern California agrees to
reduce its use of Colorado River water by up to a total
of 1 million acre feet and to direct that water to Arizona.
The Resolution articulates specific definitions for sur-
pluses and shortages, each of which triggers different
rules with regard to how much surplus water Califor-
nia can appropriate during the interim period. Accord-
ing to the Resolution, a “normal year” is defined by the
Secretary of the Interior as one in which “no more
than 7.5 maf of Colorado River water shall be deliv-
ered for consumptive use” in the Lower Basin states
(SRJ 1001, Article 1.1.20). A shortage year is defined
as “Any year when the Secretary determines, under Ar-
ticle II(B)(3) of the Decree in Arizona v. California,
and the Criteria for Coordinated Long-Range Opera-
tion of Colorado River Reservoirs Pursuant to the
Colorado River Basin Project Act of September 30,
1968, that insufficient water is available for release to
satisfy annual consumptive use of 7,500,000 af in the
states of California, Nevada and Arizona collectively”
(SJR 1001, Article 1.1.25).
During a normal year, the elevation of Lake Mead stor-
age is projected to be at 1,125 feet. A partial domestic
surplus year is defined occurring when Lake Mead
storage is between 1,125 and 1,145 feet in elevation
(Article 4, 4.2 and 4.3). Full domestic surplus years oc-
cur when Lake Mead is projected to have an elevation
greater than 1,145 feet, but less than the amount that
would initiate a “surplus” determination. Quantified
surpluses are established by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior according to the 50% (California), 46% (Arizona)
and 4% (Nevada) rule included in the Law of the
River. However, the Resolution stipulates how the sur-
pluses are to be used. They are specifically to be used
by California and Nevada to meet basic demand. Con-
versely, Arizona’s share is expected to be allocated to
surplus demands, including “Off-stream Banking and
interstate banking demands” (SJR 1001 Article 4.5.3).
Any remaining water is to continue to be stored in
Lake Mead (SJR 1001, Article 4.5.6).
If a Flood Control Surplus Year is declared, “MWD
[Metropolitan Water District of California] and the
State of Arizona agree that releases may be made to sat-
isfy all beneficial uses within California and Arizona,
including unlimited off-stream banking and section
215 deliveries qualifying under the Reclamation Re-
form Act of 1982 (95 Stat. 1263). MWD and Arizona
contractors may make their orders for Colorado River
water to the Secretary without any limitation under
this agreement. Thereafter, the Secretary may notify
the United States Section of the International Bound-
ary and Water Commission that there may be a surplus
of water as provided in Article 10 of the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Treaty Between the United States of America and
Mexico, signed February 3, 1944 (‘Mexican Water
Treaty of 1944’)” (Article 4.6). Skilled climate forecast
and related river supply outlook information in ad-
vance would be very useful to decision makers and wa-
ter managers in the Lower Basin and in Mexico, under
this type of situation
Not surprisingly, the Joint Resolution goes into some
detail regarding the obligations of the MWD during
years of shortage, during and after the 15-year interim
period, or if there is a suspension in the interim sur-
plus guidelines. In effect, if the Secretary declares a
shortage, MWD is barred from ordering water in ex-
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cess of the allotted 4.4 maf. Furthermore, if the Secre-
tary releases water to MWD under either a Partial or
Full Domestic Surplus condition during the 15-year
interim period, and subsequently declares a Shortage
Year during the Interim Period—and if the declaration
causes deliveries to Arizona to be reduced—MWD
must compensate Arizona for the impacts of the short-
age. In this situation, MWD is to reduce its order for
Colorado River Water for the shortage year by enough
to ensure that total consumptive use of that water in
California remains less than 4.4 maf.7 The water fore-
gone is intended exclusively for consumptive use in
Arizona (Article 5.2, and 5.2.1). Both Arizona and
California would benefit from the kind of forewarning
that skilled climate and water supply forecasting could
potentially supply in this situation.
Under the Resolution, MWD and Arizona Depart-
ment of Water Resources may agree to share the im-
pact of shortages. As noted above, use of skilled fore-
casts would be of significant benefit, for the two
entities must confer to assess the relative impact of the
shortage on the states. If the shortage appears likely to
last more than one year, ADWR may (after consulting
with Colorado River contractors in Arizona) consent
to allow MWD to spread the shortage reparation over
more than one year. If this type of agreement is made,
MWD is to reduce its water order for the next two or
more years (Section 5.2.2). Interestingly, even if the
years following the Shortage Year are not also declared
to be such, MWD is still obligated to forego use of
Colorado River water and to return the water owing to
Arizona in subsequent years. In this event, MWD
must acknowledge that Arizona may not need the wa-
ter for direct use; if this is the case, MWD agrees to
pay the actual cost to store the forgone water in Ari-
zona through the Arizona Water Banking Authority
(Section 5.2.2.1).
Implementation of Article 5.2.3 of the Joint Resolu-
tion also suggests the importance of incorporating cli-
mate forecasts into decision making, for it stipulates
that MWD can enter into interstate banking arrange-
ments with the Arizona Water Banking Authority. The
arrangement includes allowing MWD to call on cred-
its held by AWBA to replace MWD water that would
otherwise have to be forborne under the provisions
outlined above.
According to Articles 5.3, 5.3.1., and 5.3.2, if the Sec-
retary releases water to MWD under either Partial or
Full Domestic Surplus during the interim period, then
declares a year after the Interim Period to be a Short-
age Year, MWD agrees to compensate Arizona for the
impacts of the shortage. This involves reducing its or-
der for Colorado River water by an amount equal to
that by which the Secretary limits consumptive use of
river water, by Arizona, to less than 2.8 maf.8 MWD
must notify Arizona, within 60 days of receipt of no-
tice of a Shortage Year (via the Annual Operating
Plan), how it will fulfill its obligations. In turn, Ari-
zona has 15 days from receipt of the notice to lodge an
objection and MWD has a subsequent 15 days to re-
spond. Other provisions apply if the Interim Surplus
Guidelines are suspended. Access to long-term fore-
casts could enable Arizona to better anticipate notifica-
tion in advance of the 60-day requirement.
Under the Joint Resolution, Arizona contractors are
limited in how they can use surplus water during the
Interim Period. In a Partial or Full Domestic Surplus
Year, the state agrees to partially waive its contractual
rights to surplus Colorado River water; in other words,
consumption will remain within the state’s basic ap-
portionment of 2.8 maf. In a Quantified Surplus Year
(i.e., when the Secretary determines that water should
be released for use to reduce the risk of potential spills
from the reservoirs), the Secretary is expected to allo-
cate the surplus sequentially according to the 50-46-4
percent formula stipulated in the Law of the River
rules. Arizona’s share of the surplus is expected to be al-
located first to meet basic demands, then to any re-
maining direct-delivery domestic uses and off-stream
banking. This latter includes interstate banking as well
as off-stream banking demand. Any water left over is
to remain in storage in Lake Mead.
Article 10 makes some stipulations to the Resolution
that have potentially significant implications for man-
agement, under unusual stresses (“force majeure”) af-
fecting the Colorado River over the 15-years of the in-
terim period. In essence, if the obligations stipulated in
the Resolution are hindered, interrupted or prevented
by “wars, strikes, lockouts, fire, acts of God or by other
acts of military authority, or by any other cause beyond
the control of the respective parties,” the obligations
are to be extended to the extent and for the period of
time that performance is affected by the event. Obliga-
tions resume when the stress is no longer an issue (Ar-
ticles 9.1, 9.2). Notably, the Resolution also explicitly
states that it is not to be “construed as a conveyance,
abandonment, or waiver of any water right, or the
right to use the water, nor shall it be construed as con-
ferring any right whatsoever upon any person, firm,
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corporation or other public or private entity not a
party to this agreement” (Article 10.3). These two pro-
visions have significance under conditions of severe cli-
matic stress (which could be interpreted as an act of
God or a cause beyond the control of the parties to the
Resolution), for it reinforces prior institutional ar-
rangements governing water allocation in the Lower
Basin. Thus, climate impacts would be dealt with
through the longer-standing rules under the Law of
the River.
6.3. The Groundwater Management Act
The primary water management entity in Arizona is
the Department of Water Resources (ADWR), which
was established under the Groundwater Management
Act of 1980. In addition to overseeing water supply
and demand in all areas of the state, ADWR has desig-
nated five Active Management Areas (AMAs) where
stricter regulatory mechanisms are in effect. The basic
concept behind the groundwater use regulations in the
AMAs is safe-yield.
6.3.1. Safe-Yield
Safe-yield is defined in the Groundwater Code (A.R.S.
45 §561.12) as “a groundwater management goal
which attempts to achieve and thereafter maintain a
long-term balance between the annual amount of
groundwater withdrawn in an active management area
and the amount of natural and artificial recharge in the
active management area.” This goal is one of the fore-
most factors driving the development of ADWR poli-
cies and management plans within the AMAs.
As stipulated in the Code (A.R.S. 45.562.4) “The
management goal of the Tucson, Phoenix and Prescott
active management areas is safe-yield by January 1,
2025, or such earlier date as may be determined by the
director.” For the Santa Cruz AMA, the goal is “to
maintain a safe-yield condition... and to prevent local
water tables from experiencing long-term declines.”
The Pinal AMA, being primarily agricultural, has as its
goal allowing development of non-irrigation uses as
provided in the Groundwater Code, and to “preserve
existing agricultural economies ... for as long as fea-
sible, consistent with the necessity to preserve future
water supplies for non-irrigation uses.” The wording of
the provisions appears to assume relatively stable cli-
mate conditions; certainly long-term, significant
changes in the climate regime are not expressly re-
flected. Yet, unless suitably designed conservation mea-
sures are instituted in a timely manner, achieving and
sustaining safe-yield may be facilitated or constrained
by climatic conditions, particularly Colorado Basin-
wide severe sustained drought. Significantly, even
without consideration of potential climatic stresses, a
review of the Arizona Department of Water Resources
conducted by the Arizona Auditor General in 1999
found that the Phoenix and Tucson AMAs are unlikely
to meet their safe-yield goals by 2025, as specified in
the Groundwater Code (Norton 1999).
6.3.2. Groundwater Recharge
Although often addressed in water accounting as a
constant, recharge rates in fact vary widely according
to climatic conditions. The relationship between pre-
cipitation and recharge is complex. Factors such as sea-
sonality and duration of rainfall, temperature, hydro-
logic structure and the amount of time between the
precipitation event and when the water actually
reaches the aquifer must all be taken into account, as
must the speed and direction of water movement into,
through, and out of the aquifer. Climatic variability,
particularly extended periods of deep drought, would
have significant impact on the sustainable manage-
ment of groundwater supplies. At the same time, sci-
entific understanding of recharge processes remains
very imprecise, which means that even with the best
climate information, more research is needed to deter-
mine the impacts of climate variability on aquifer re-
charge rates and, by extension, recharge of surface wa-
ter bodies by subflows from aquifers.
6.3.3. Assured Water Supply Rules, Grandfathered Rights,
and Exempt Wells
One aspect of the Groundwater Management Act that
is particularly salient to this analysis is the Assured Wa-
ter Supply (AWS) rules. The AWS program was origi-
nally established in Arizona in 1973 to preserve
groundwater resources and to promote long-term wa-
ter supply planning. The program also serves to protect
consumers by requiring developers to demonstrate that
sufficient water supplies are available to support new
subdivisions, prior to sale (ADWR 1997). The original
1973 Water Adequacy law still governs areas outside
the AMAs and unsubdivided land within the AMAs.
The AWS program was modified by the Groundwater
Management Act of 1980 to emphasize more strongly
actual achievement of safe-yield. The new provisions
went beyond the 1973 law to prohibit the sale or lease
of subdivided land in an AMA without demonstration
of an assured water supply (that is, a sufficient quantity
of water of adequate quality to last at least 100 years),
consistency with the AMA management goals, and fi-
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nancial ability to construct delivery systems and related
features. The AWS rules were again modified in 1995.
Chief among the amendments was a rule requiring that
AWS be demonstrated using predominantly renewable
supplies, for example CAP water and/or effluent.
Today, under the Groundwater Code, a water provider
or developer must demonstrate that water of sufficient
quantity and quality is available to sustain use for 100
years; that the proposed use is consistent with the
AMA management plan and goals; and that the water
provider possesses the financial capability required to
build the necessary water delivery and treatment sys-
tems (see ADWR 1997). AWS rules stipulate that any-
one who offers subdivided or unsubdivided land for
sale or lease must demonstrate to ADWR, before the
land is marketed, that an assured supply of water exists
for that land. Developers can satisfy these rules in two
ways, either through obtaining their own certificate of
assured supply or through providing written proof that
a water provider who possesses a designation of assured
supply has agreed to supply water to that development
(see ADWR 1997). AWS rules required all existing wa-
ter providers to have provided demonstration of an as-
sured supply by 2001.
The AWS rule requiring continuous physical and legal
availability of water for 100 years is the most salient
with regard to the impacts of climate variability on wa-
ter supply in the AMAs. Satisfying the rule, particu-
larly when the emphasis is on demonstration of suffi-
cient renewable water, becomes much more challenging
when the potential of severe sustained drought is con-
sidered. The AWS determination is based on hydro-
logic analysis of potential water supply and demand,
which in turn is typically based either on a determina-
tion of mean annual climate for a designated period of
the historical record or on a relatively conservative distri-
bution of climate variance. However, such assumptions
fail to consider the potential impacts of deeper and
more sustained drought conditions, such as those that
occurred during the 1950s. Backup resources are re-
quired where primary reliance is on groundwater, yet
stresses could be exacerbated by growth in demand, po-
tentially leading to conflicts among water users. The as-
sumptions also fail to take into account long-term shifts
in climatic means and extremes.9
While groundwater pumping is thus restricted, exist-
ing providers and some new subdivisions (depending
on the depth to the water table at their location) are
given an allowable groundwater allocation. The
groundwater allocation is comprised of a basic alloca-
tion of acceptable overdraft, an incidental recharge fac-
tor, and extinguishment credits. In the Phoenix, Tuc-
son, and Prescott AMAs, the basic allocation rules for
physical availability of water (as opposed to the volume
of groundwater allocated) are designed to assure that
the water table does not drop to more than 1,000 feet
below the land surface. Again, extended severe drought
could challenge the ability of providers to adhere to
this rule.
The incidental recharge factor is the portion of allow-
able groundwater pumping most likely to be affected
by climate change. Incidental recharge is the amount
of water used outdoors for purposes such as irrigation
of turf and landscapes that is expected to trickle down
and return to the aquifer. At present, the incidental re-
charge allocation in the water budgets of the AMAs is
set at 4 percent of the demand in the previous year.
However, this factor is likely to be reduced in times of
elevated evapotranspiration rates, which typically occur
during droughts, when extended periods of sunny
weather prevail. Demand is likely to be highest under
these conditions, and higher than normal rates of inci-
dental recharge would be registered. However, a greater
percentage of the water used could be lost to evapora-
tion. Incidental recharge amounts would also be com-
promised in situations where severe drought and water
shortages led to restrictions on outdoor water use, but
other types of demand remained higher than normal.
Thus an across-the-board incidental recharge factor may
not accurately reflect conditions in a changing climate.
6.3.4. Extinguishment Credits
The third component of the groundwater allocation,
extinguishment credits, is designed to facilitate reduc-
tions in certain kinds of water use, for example,
grandfathered water rights for agricultural irrigation
(see A.R.S. §§ 45-462 through 45-465). The credits
are intended to serve as an incentive to these right
holders to permanently retire their rights. In some
cases, rights to the amount of groundwater thus retired
and credited may be purchased for use away from that
parcel of land by water providers attempting to prove
an assured water supply. The extinguishment credits
provision ends in 2025; however, and thus does not re-
ally provide a long-term resolution to the issue of wa-
ter rights reallocation. Further, within all of the AMAs,
the amount of groundwater tied up in grandfathered
rights exceeds the amount that is actually being re-
charged; thus there is more “paper water” in existence
than what is legally available for withdrawal and use.
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The Phoenix Third Management Plan notes that the
total of all “residual pumping” legal exemptions, in-
cluding those for grandfathered right holders, water
providers and permit holders, amounts to 238,000 af
per year (ADWR 1999a: 12-5). In an effort to close
this loophole, AWS rules require that the physical
availability of the water be proven, regardless of the
amount of paper water an applicant for AWS certifica-
tion may have accrued.
Arizona surface water law specifies the relative value of
uses of water in situations where “conflicting applica-
tions for the use of water from a given water supply,
when the capacity of the supply is not sufficient for all
applications....” The priority specified in A.R.S. 45-
157 is as follows:
1. Domestic and municipal uses, including gar-
dens not exceeding one-half acre per family
2. Irrigation and stock watering
3. Power and mining uses
4. Recreation and wildlife, including fish
5. Nonrecoverable water storage (pursuant to
A.R.S. 45-833.01)
The prioritization of the relative value of water consti-
tutes a potentially powerful tool for coping with severe
extended drought, particularly if CAP supplies are sig-
nificantly reduced or even eliminated. To date, this
provision has not been tested in areas where increased
groundwater pumping may not be a sufficient—or vi-
able—option.
6.3.5. Assured Water Supply and Climate Variability
Some features of the AWS rules may make these regu-
lations useful for monitoring and coping with climate
impacts. Designated water providers must file annual
reports on water demand and supply, and can ask that
a certificate be amended if they secure new water sup-
plies. AWS designations and certificates are reviewed at
least every 15 years, and can be amended or revoked by
ADWR if a designated provider is out of compliance
with the management plan or goal of their AMA, does
not construct necessary treatment or storage facilities,
or fails to meet its replenishment obligation. This is
clearly preferable to a system where a provider could
acquire the 100-year assured water supply designation
at a single point in time, and then (if no growth oc-
curs) not be subject to review of its water supply and
demand for a century, during which time supply and
demand characteristics, as well as other factors, could
have changed significantly.
AWS regulations should be fairly easy to enforce with
regard new subdivisions, since without an AWS certifi-
cate the Arizona Department of Real Estate will not
authorize the sale of homes in a subdivision. However,
there is a limitation to the flexibility of AWS rules: a
certificate of AWS cannot be revoked once any of the
residential lots within the subdivision have been sold.
This means that, under a Certificate of AWS, a perma-
nent change in the water supply that occurs during a
possibly long development period will not constitute
grounds for stopping the development. There are re-
ports of unscrupulous developers who have attempted
to skirt the AWS rules by staying outside of the legal
definition of a subdivision, which is defined in real es-
tate law as land divided into six or more parcels with at
least one parcel having an area of less than 36 acres. If,
however, the developer has proven in writing that wa-
ter is being provided by a water provider holding an
ADWR-issued Designation of Assured Supply, ADWR
has greater flexibility to intercede in resolving the issue
through working with that provider (for more infor-
mation, refer to ADWR 1999a and 199b).
There are also concerns about the number of domestic
wells that rely on groundwater exclusively. The amount
withdrawn by individual exempt wells must be 35 gal-
lons per minute or less; however, the urban sprawl and
more dense well spacing seen in each study area indi-
cates that the combined impact of unregulated wells
could be significant (Glennon and Maddock 1994).
This phenomenon is thought to be a major factor be-
hind the drop in the water table in the Sierra Vista
area, and is probably affecting other areas as well.
Since wells of this nature are generally shallow and
therefore more closely connected with surface water
conditions than deeper wells, they are far more likely
to suffer shortages during severe sustained droughts.
Adding to their vulnerability is the fact that unlike
municipal water providers, domestic wells are un-
likely to have back-up systems or extensive water
storage facilities.
6.4. Groundwater Management Within versus
Outside the AMAs
Issues surrounding the extent of groundwater contribu-
tions to surface flow in the San Pedro River, and the ef-
fects of groundwater pumping on stream recharge in the
Sierra Vista area illustrate an overarching limitation of
the GWMA: it constitutes a strong regulatory policy in
the designated AMAs, but it does not effectively address
issues surrounding surface water-groundwater connec-
tivity.10 Glennon and Maddock (1994) note that this is-
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sue is based on outdated and incomplete understanding
of hydrological processes.
There is widespread agreement that the failure to con-
sider the integration of groundwater and surface water
policy has caused serious problems in water manage-
ment. It is highly likely that, under conditions of cli-
matic stress, this weakness in existing water policy
would pose challenges to effective and equitable water
management. Already, the lack of conjunctive manage-
ment of water resources has led to the fragmentation of
water management in the Phoenix AMA, where sur-
face water, CAP water, and effluent are subject to dif-
ferent regulations, and owned or controlled by differ-
ent jurisdictions (ADWR 1999a: 12-3). Riparian
habitat, instream flows, and water quality issues com-
plicate the issue further, for these elements are also not
managed by the ADWR at the AMA level.
6.5. Water Transfers into the AMAs
Water transfers proved to be a highly contentious issue
in Arizona in the mid-to late 1980s, when cities such
as Scottsdale, adjacent to Phoenix, began buying prop-
erties in remote parts of the state to gain access to the
water rights appurtenant to those lands. The idea was
to retire the land, and ship the water, via interbasin
transfer, to the right holder. Rural counties protested,
noting that such interbasin transfers deprived them of
not only water, but also of the direct and indirect in-
come generated by agricultural activities. In response
to strong political opposition, the Arizona Legislature,
in 1991, enacted the Groundwater Transportation Act,
which severely constrains the ability of municipal wa-
ter providers to transfer groundwater from rural basins
to urban areas. However, the Act does provide a legal
framework allowing for certain interbasin groundwater
transfers that assist in efforts to demonstrate an assured
water supply (see A.R.S. 45-544 and Article 45-551).
This latter exception to the ban in interbasin transfers
may prove to be important in the event of a severe sus-
tained drought of 10 years or more.
6.6. Regulation of Water Providers – Municipal and
Private
All providers in the AMAs must comply with the rules
and regulations issued by the Arizona Department of
Water Resources. In addition, municipal water provid-
ers in Arizona are regulated by the governing body of
the municipality in which the operation is located. In
the Tucson AMA, for example, Tucson Water, the mu-
nicipal provider for the City of Tucson, is regulated by
the City Council; the City Manager’s office is also in-
volved in overseeing the utility and its director. By
contrast, non-municipal service operations are gov-
erned by the Arizona Corporation Commission
(ACC), as provided in the Arizona State Constitution
(A.R.S. 40). The ACC has as its first priority regulat-
ing the rates charged by these providers. As detailed in
A.R.S. 40-370, the ACC “shall authorize water utilities
to recover increases in specific operating costs by
means of a surcharge on water sales and to reduce rates
when those specific operating costs decrease. The oper-
ating costs that may be considered in this procedure
are limited to specific, readily identifiable costs that are
subject to the control of another person, including the
cost of purchasing electricity or gas, the cost of pur-
chasing water from another utility, municipality or dis-
trict....” Notably, passing the costs of conservation on
to customers in the form of increased water rates under
conditions of drought stress is not included in the stat-
ute. This omission has significant implications for pro-
viders’ ability to manage supplies effectively under con-
ditions of water scarcity, such as those posed by
drought. While some providers, especially those with
large groundwater reserves and proportionally low lev-
els of demand, could probably weather even a severe
sustained drought, others are already stressed even un-
der “normal” climate conditions. Inability to enforce
conservation measures among their customers, includ-
ing raising rates to cover conservation activities, could
seriously constrain the capacity of these providers to
meet demand. This situation exemplifies a potential
scale problem in managing water resources, and in as-
sessing vulnerability to climate: assessments made at
the AMA scale may miss important potential impacts
at finer scales of resolution.
7. Issues and Implications in the AMAs
Each urban area in Arizona faces unique hydrological
and climatological challenges. However, it is also im-
portant to note that the areas share important similari-
ties. For example, the two largest metropolitan areas in
Arizona, encompassed by the Tucson and Phoenix
AMAs are characterized by large numbers of water
companies (147 providers in the Phoenix AMA and
151 in the Tucson AMA), most of which—especially
small providers—rely entirely on groundwater.
All the AMAs share important climate characteristics,
including a general bimodal distribution of precipita-
tion in winter and summer; spring and fall tend to be
relatively dry. Particularly notable in terms of water
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management is the fact that the late 1980s and early
1990s were some of the wettest on record in Arizona;
15 of the past 20 years have seen above-average pre-
cipitation (Western Regional Climate Center 1999).
These were decades of pronounced urban growth, and
related growth in water demand. Although fairly severe
droughts have occurred over the short term during this
time frame, their effects have been offset by the occur-
rence of several unusually wet El Niño years. While the
climate record reveals the occurrence of significant
droughts, such as that of the 1950s, and local accounts
illustrate that people coped rather effectively with these
kinds of climatic stresses, the consequences of a recur-
rence of such conditions at current and projected ur-
ban population levels could be far more severe.
7.1. Revisiting the Groundwater Code: Safe-Yield
Task Force
Assessing the impacts of such stresses requires analysis
of the social, political and economic characteristics
that determine water supply and demand in each spe-
cific urban area. Insights into the issues and concerns
of the urban AMAs emerged recently through a recent
review of ADWR, conducted by the State Auditor
General’s Office (Norton 1999). In response to the re-
view, which stressed that achievement of safe-yield was
highly unlikely to occur by the legislatively specified
year 2025, a “Safe-Yield Task Force” process was initi-
ated in the AMAs. The purpose of the task force pro-
cess, still underway, has been to examine, at the AMA
and the state levels, barriers to achieving safe-yield, and
to raise the identified issues (with recommendations
for resolution) to the state level. At the state level, the
Governor of Arizona appointed a Water Commission
responsible for recommending legislative changes to
state water law. The Commission is made up of promi-
nent individuals representing a range of interests. In
the Pinal, Prescott and Santa Cruz AMAs, the local
Groundwater Users Advisory Council (GUAC) as-
sumed responsibility for the process. By contrast, in
the Phoenix and Tucson AMAs, a broader process in-
volving an extensive open meeting process was
adopted. In these two AMAs, the process has included
participation by private and municipal water managers
and providers, agricultural interests, mining represen-
tatives and other industrial interests, and members of
general public.
Due to the large number of issues to be covered, sub-
committees focusing on designated issue subsets were
formed in the Tucson and Phoenix AMAs. Each of the
groups formulated a series of issue papers, identifying
specific problems and recommending possible
solution(s); the issue papers were approved by formally
designated task force members, then forwarded to the
state-level Governor’s Water Commission, and its
Technical Advisory Committee, for further consider-
ation. The state-level group then assembled the issues
into “families” of issues. Evaluation of the issue fami-
lies and formulating recommendations for legislative
changes is currently underway.
7.2. Potential Climate Impacts on Institutions –
Phoenix Active Management Area
The Phoenix metropolitan area is one of the fastest
growing areas in the nation; the population of
Maricopa County, where most of the Phoenix metro-
politan area is located, is expected to increase from
2,721,761 in 1997 to 4,948,423 by 2025 (ADES
1999). Projections of the impact of such growth on
water supplies indicate that, while population is ex-
pected to increase by 45 percent, water supplies are
projected to increase by 20 percent, resulting in an in-
crease in groundwater overdraft in the AMA from
365,707 af in 1995 (ADWR 1999a: 11-21) to
412,467 af by 2025. Thus, even under assumptions of
climate stationarity, and continuation of generally the
above-average precipitation levels experienced in the
past decade (Western Regional Climate Center 1999),
attainment of safe-yield is looking increasingly un-
likely. Indeed, according to the recently released Third
Management Plan for the Phoenix AMA,
…based on current projections of water de-
mand and supply, the Phoenix AMA will not
be at safe-yield in 2025. Although safe-yield is
an attainable goal, it is apparent that sufficient
progress has not been made toward this goal,
nor have the statutory and institutional struc-
tures necessary to succeed been fully
established…The AMA also lacks the under-
standing and support by the community for a
full range of water management initiatives.
(ADWR 1999a: 12-1)
The Phoenix AMA is somewhat unique among the
AMAs in that it has significant surface water resources,
as well as groundwater reserves and access to CAP wa-
ter. However, as the AMA’s Third Management Plan
notes, “Renewable supply reliability is almost exclu-
sively dependent on weather patterns in the watershed
which can limit the amount and timing of renewable
supplies.” (ADWR 1999a: 3-1). Further, multiple
sources of water are available only to portions of the
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AMA; other areas rely entirely on groundwater, and
some of these latter areas already have concerns about
adequate supply even under normal climate conditions.
A climate sensitivity analysis conducted by CLIMAS
(Carter et al. 2000) sought to explore the potential im-
pacts of drought on water supply and demand by the
municipal, agricultural, industrial and riparian sectors
of water use. In the study, the AMA’s water budget for
2025 was adjusted based on percentage decrease in re-
newable supply that might be generated by a recur-
rence of the most intense historic droughts of one-,
five-, and 10-year durations. Some of the key findings
for the Phoenix AMA are summarized below.
7.2.1. Potential Implications of a One-Year Severe
Drought – Phoenix AMA
If a severely dry winter similar to that of 1903-1904
(the driest winter on record) were to recur under the
population and demand pressures projected for 2025,
a 44 percent decrease in supply and a 6 percent in-
crease in demand would be likely to occur in the Phoe-
nix AMA. The AMA, as has occurred under similar
conditions in the recent past, would most likely cope
with the situation by drawing down reservoir levels
and increasing groundwater pumping. Indeed, the
two-year drought of 1998 to 2000 resulted in deple-
tion of one of the primary surface water sources for the
AMA, the Salt River Project’s Roosevelt Lake Reser-
voir. By the beginning of winter 2000, the reservoir
was at only 17 percent capacity (Central Arizona
Project, 2000). Higher energy costs associated with in-
creased pumping and conveyance would likely occur.
It is unlikely that, under similar drought conditions,
the full cost of coping with reduced supplies would be
immediately or directly passed on to consumers. It is
also unlikely that stricter conservation measures (such
as limiting outdoor watering, car washing, etc.) would
be invoked. The Third Management Plan for the
Phoenix AMA (ADWR 1999a: 12-6) notes that there
is a waning commitment to voluntary conservation on
the part of water users, due to users’ assumptions that
the greater emphasis on the use of renewable supplies
decreases the need to conserve. The plan observes that,
in this type of context, “Conservation goals need to be
reinforced through pricing structures, ordinances, in-
centives, informed governmental decisions, and public
information about the serious long-term nature of wa-
ter supply limitations in the area.” (ADWR 1999a: 12-
6). Motivating consumers through the proper combi-
nations of incentives and regulation is pivotal to
changing existing water use behavior.
7.2.2. Potential Implications of a Five- or 10-Year Severe
Drought – Phoenix AMA
The cumulative impacts of the most severe five- and
10-year droughts recorded in the climate reporting di-
vision that encompasses the Phoenix AMA (1900-
1904, and 1946-1955, respectively) would likely have
significant consequences for water providers and man-
agers in the Phoenix AMA, including water table de-
clines and subsidence. A recurrence of the worst five-
year drought in the historical record, combined with
demand conditions projected for 2025, would place
considerable stress on the AMA’s water system. The
CLIMAS sensitivity analysis suggests that the shortfall
in renewable supplies for meeting business-as-usual de-
mand might range from 47 percent to 67 percent of
normal renewable supply levels, averaged over the five-
year period. The lower figure reflects continued full de-
livery of CAP water while the higher figure reflects a
total cutoff in CAP supplies for the duration of the
drought. A recurrence of the worst 10-year drought in
the historical record, combined with 2025 demand
projections, could produce shortfalls in renewable sup-
plies ranging from 39 percent to 58 percent, averaged
over the 10-year period. Again, the lower percentage
reflects continued full availability of CAP water while
the higher percentage reflects a complete cutoff of
CAP water throughout the drought. While these per-
centages are somewhat lower than those for the five-
year scenario, they are still significant and would likely
lead to changes in water management policy and prac-
tices. Some of these changes would likely be tempo-
rary, such as stringent controls on water consumption.
Others might be permanent, such as enhanced infra-
structure and increased interlinkage among provider
systems.
Particularly in the context of an extended severe
drought, the policies most likely to be examined would
be existing restrictions on water transfers among right
holders and from outside the AMA boundaries, the
safe-yield provisions of the Groundwater Code, water
availability and delivery policies associated with the
Arizona Water Bank and various other recharge
projects, and the assured water supply rules. In the re-
cent two-year drought, for example, the Salt River
Project, a major provider of water to Phoenix, negoti-
ated a one-time purchase of water from the Central
Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) to
augment its seriously dwindling supplies (Central
Arizona Project 2000). It is worth noting, however,
that the principals involved in the negotiation explic-
itly restricted the arrangement to that single transac-
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tion. Also likely to be scrutinized would be the rules
of the Arizona Corporation Commission, particularly
with regard to current restrictions prohibiting private
water companies from passing costs of conservation
programs on to customers.
New developments might find it more difficult to ob-
tain a certificate of Assured Water Supply, and those
wishing to drill new “exempt” wells might be more
tightly regulated, though it is unlikely that ADWR
could (or would) completely deny such activity. New
incentives would likely be formulated to facilitate the
transfer of water from agricultural water right holders
to higher-value urban uses, and provisional agreements
might be sought with local Indian Tribes to purchase
water for the duration of the drought. Conservation
measures would likely include increasing incentives for
low-water use landscaping and appliances, restructur-
ing and raising of water rates, and bans on certain
kinds of non-essential water use. These would be sig-
nificant changes, for, as noted in the Phoenix AMA’s
Third Management Plan,
The undervalued cost of water in most in-
stances, as well as the cost differential between
certain renewable sources of water and
groundwater, provides little incentive to maxi-
mize efficiency or reduce groundwater use.
The cost of using groundwater should be
commensurate with the value placed on it and
should reflect the cost of overdrafting ground-
water. (ADWR 1999a: 12-5).
Managers of “turf” facilities such as parks and golf
courses would likely face substantially higher water
costs, and possibly conservation measures restricting
the amount of turf they could irrigate. Likewise, resi-
dential areas featuring lush expanses of turf and artifi-
cial lakes and streams might be hard pressed to sustain
their landscapes and, more importantly, their real es-
tate values. In these cases an extended drought could
be expected to prompt efforts to reprioritize water
uses. Building codes might be revised to encourage
greater water conservation and less emphasis on water-
intensive landscapes. It is also likely that riparian areas
would come under greater stress due to strong compe-
tition for scarce water.
At the individual level, rising water prices and stricter
rules might diminish the panache of owning swim-
ming pools and having tropical style landscaping, and
result in a greater number homeowners adopting
desert landscaping and water-conserving behaviors. In
the agricultural arena, severe sustained drought (lasting
10 years or longer) might lead policy makers to insti-
tute subsidization programs that would encourage
farmers to fallow their fields for the duration of the
drought. Mechanisms for municipal water providers to
lease or purchase agricultural water rights would likely
be pursued as a longer-term strategy to buffer against
future drought.
While urban growth has increasingly replaced agricul-
ture in terms of land use within the Phoenix AMA, wa-
ter experts expect large water settlements involving local
Indian tribal lands to be used for agricultural purposes;
thus, the AMA does not anticipate that agriculture will
completely disappear. It is, however, likely that inordi-
nately dry conditions lasting 10 years or longer would
generate substantial changes in the extent and types of
farming carried out on tribal and non-tribal agricultural
lands within the AMA. Notably, the water sensitivity
analysis conducted by the CLIMAS Urban Water team
indicates that, even if all agricultural water use were in-
stead dedicated toward meeting municipal and indus-
trial needs, substantial deficits would remain.
The issue of agricultural-to-urban land-use transforma-
tion is particularly salient in the Phoenix AMA, for ag-
ricultural demand currently comprises 75 percent of
total water demand, and is expected to decrease only to
60 percent of total demand by 2025. Although thou-
sands of acres of former farmland are converted to ur-
ban uses every year, overall agricultural water use re-
mains relatively steady (ADWR 1999a: 12-1). The
impact that urbanization of former agricultural lands
will have on water demand is likely to depend not only
on the availability of water that is no longer used by
crops, but also on the zoning density of new municipal
areas. The issue becomes more complex when other
and often more immediately salient issues such as com-
modity prices and government subsidy policies are
considered. The question of whether new development
should take place on converted farm land, where one ex-
isting water use is replaced by another, or on virgin
desert land, where new water demands are generated,
must also be taken into account (ADWR 1999a: 12-5).
As noted above, the extent that agricultural water allot-
ments could be switched to municipal uses is limited,
since agriculture in the AMA is increasingly taking
place on Indian lands, and Indian water allotment
settlements have typically included explicit restrictions
on use and exchange of the water resources involved in
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the individual settlements. (Checcio and Colby 1993).
Adjudication of rights to surface water on the Gila River
and its tributaries has been in process since 1979, and
several Colorado River tribes are currently litigating for
additional water rights to Colorado River water (Hansen
1995). The decisions rendered in these cases are sure to
have major impacts on water management in the state,
and are likely to be felt strongly in the Phoenix AMA.
Actions are currently being taken to better protect the
Phoenix AMA from water shortages in times of
drought. As mentioned above, the Arizona Water
Banking Authority (AWBA Commission 1998) plans
to store as much water as possible over the next 20
years as insurance against drought. Further, the Third
Management Plan for the Phoenix AMA reports that
22 full-scale underground storage and groundwater
savings recharge facilities have been issued permits in
the AMA during the last 10 years. During that time,
564,000 af of water has been stored. Permits have been
issued for nearly 700,000 af of additional annual stor-
age capacity, and for 11 pilot recharge facilities
(ADWR 1999a: 12-2). Preliminary results of a survey
of reservoir capacity indicate that many large water
providers intend to expand their reservoir space. It is
also possible that existing storage capacity could be ex-
panded through raising dam heights. The heights of
Roosevelt and San Carlos Dams have been recently
raised for exactly this reason.
As noted earlier, the eight reservoirs serving the Lower
Basin (including Lake Powell) have the capacity to
store approximately four and a half years of the river’s
flow, thus providing a considerable buffer against
drought. However, since Arizona’s CAP allotment has
only fourth priority under the Law of the River, the
CAP-dependent water systems remain vulnerable to
potentially deep, sustained drought. A commonly held
view among water managers is that it is highly unlikely
that a severe drought would simultaneously affect both
the Salt-Verde system and the Colorado watershed.
However, the Severe Sustained Drought project dem-
onstrated that just such a severe and widespread
drought occurred in the 16th century (Meko et al.
1995). Patterns in the paleo record, dating back 1,000
years, as well as the historical record suggest that it is
prudent to bear in mind the possibility of similar cli-
matic shifts in the future.
If such a severe regional drought were to occur under
existing and anticipated demand patterns, including
the patterns of more senior right holders such as Cali-
fornia and Nevada, water linked to Arizona’s more jun-
ior CAP allocation could diminish or completely cease
to flow through the canal. The loss of CAP water avail-
ability would certainly challenge water management in
the Phoenix AMA, for much of the agriculture in the
AMA depends on heavily subsidized CAP water. Sus-
pension of this supply, or loss of subsidies, would drive
agricultural water users to shift to groundwater, or to
seek other sources.
A large shift to groundwater use under drought stresses
would have significant implications for water manage-
ment as well, for a substantial number of agricultural
right holders have water rights that were grandfathered
in when the Groundwater Code was enacted in 1980.
In addition, substantial groundwater impacts would
likely be generated by agriculturalists who have en-
gaged in “in lieu” water transactions whereby they ac-
crue groundwater credits by agreeing to use CAP water
instead. If they began to call in their credits, the imbal-
ance between renewable supply and demand would in-
crease substantially, pushing the AMA ever farther
from the possibility of achieving safe-yield.
Some tribal allotments would also suffer, in cases
where the new water rights have involved CAP water.
At the same time, retirement of agricultural lands, even
if just for the duration of the drought, would create its
own problems: unsightly landscapes, greater air pollu-
tion, loss of top soil through increased wind and water
erosion, and other impacts. While some of these lands
might be transformed into housing or industrial/com-
mercial developments, this would not occur on all re-
tired lands. Large parcels of Indian agricultural lands
within and adjacent to the AMA, for example, would
probably not be transformed to such uses.
Severe sustained drought such as that experienced in
the 1950s, not to mention the even more widespread
and intense drought of the 1500s, could be expected to
exacerbate subsidence problems in areas where cones of
depression deepen and widen. This would likely occur,
though to a lesser degree, even with intensified conser-
vation programs. Further, water table declines would
undoubtedly necessitate increased electricity demand
for pumping water at greater depths, at precisely the
same time that electrical generation was intensifying in
other sectors, such as commercial and residential cool-
ing. The recent power issues in California provide a
glimpse of what a worst-case scenario might be in the
greater Phoenix metropolitan area. Pressures to import
water, via the CAP canal or other means, to the AMA
26
CLIMAS
would intensify, and the rural-urban contests of the
1980s over whether the cities have a right to destroy
rural community viability by diverting water supplies
(Oggins and Ingram 1990), would be replayed at an
even higher pitch.
7.3. Potential Climate Impacts on Institutions –
Tucson Active Management Area
In contrast to the multitude of water sources utilized
within the Phoenix AMA, water providers in the Tuc-
son AMA have, until this year, been dependent on
groundwater as their source of a reliable water supply.
In fact, Tucson was, for a number of years, the largest
city in the nation to rely exclusively on groundwater.
Before the completion of the CAP canal to Tucson in
1992, the specter of severe sustained drought hovered
over the AMA’s already unsustainable water use pat-
terns. With the addition of CAP supplies and some
easing of Tucson voters’ resistance to receiving CAP
water in their homes, the AMA will no longer rely
solely on groundwater to meet its demand. Recently,
Tucson Water began phasing in delivery of a “blend”
of recharged CAP water and local groundwater to the
78 percent of Tucson AMA residents who constitute its
customer base. Recharging CAP water into the ground
remains the primary management tool in the Tucson
AMA, even though water managers concur that few
acceptable recharge sites exist that are capable of ac-
commodating the large allotment of CAP water the
AMA contracts for each year (the Tucson AMA’s an-
nual CAP allotment is 215,333 af ).
The 1995 population of the AMA was some 768,000;
by 2025, ADWR projections indicate that the popula-
tion will increase to some 1,266,500 people (ADWR
1999b). Even at existing population levels, groundwater
reserves are being used at approximately twice the rate at
which they are replaced through natural and incidental
recharge (ADWR 1999b: 12-1). Groundwater levels
have fallen as much as 200 feet in the AMA since 1940.
This has resulted in the loss of most surface water flow
(never large to begin with) and riparian habitat in the
AMA. The Tucson AMA office of the Department of
Water Resources estimates that approximately 12 maf of
groundwater exist at or above the 1,000-foot water table
level. This is the lowest level of water-table decline al-
lowed under assured water supply provisions. At current
depletion rates, this amount could be consumed within
approximately 50 years. If the present rate of population
growth continues as expected until 2025, water de-
mands are projected to increase by 29 percent. Based on
anticipated levels of groundwater depletion, it is ex-
pected that lands overlying the Tucson Central Well
Field will experience subsidence of up to 12 feet by 2024.
As in the Phoenix AMA, assuming continued exclusive
use of groundwater, intensified groundwater overdraft
would lead to diminished well yields, increased pump-
ing costs, and possible deterioration of water quality.
The Tucson AMA’s calculations, and the CLIMAS sen-
sitivity analysis (Carter et al. 2000), suggest that the
impacts of increased demand would be significantly
buffered by supplanting much of the fossil groundwa-
ter pumping with delivery of CAP water.
7.3.1. Potential Implications of a One-Year Drought –
Tucson AMA
If the driest winter on record, from 1903-04, were to
be repeated under 2025 demand conditions in the
Tucson AMA, the projected deficit in renewable water
resources would double from 15 percent (calculated
using average annual rainfall), to 34 percent. This fig-
ure reflects the combination of a 29 percent decrease in
renewable supplies and a 3 percent increase in de-
mand. Unlike the Phoenix AMA, Tucson does not
have large reservoir capacity; in fact, supply problems
tend to occur regularly, in spring, just before the mon-
soon season begins (see, e.g., Arizona Daily Star 1999).
As has already been demonstrated in recent pre-mon-
soon contexts, severe drought would heavily tax pump-
ing and storage capacity, resulting in lower water pres-
sure and perhaps even disruptions of service. Tucson
Water is among the providers having contingency plans
that include enforceable water conservation rules; how-
ever, overall the Tucson AMA may have less short-term
conservation potential than Phoenix, in part due to the
fact that the AMA has already been successful in reduc-
ing daily water use rates. The Tucson AMA estimates us-
age to be in the neighborhood of 155,500 af per year,
based on 1995 calculations. This is an increase of ap-
proximately 17 percent from 1990, reflecting a decline
in the rate of demand growth relative to the rate of
population growth. The decline is most notable in the
municipal sector, where reductions in outdoor water use
have made a substantial impact. For example, new de-
velopments are subject to restrictions on the amount of
water-intensive landscaping that may be installed, and
public landscapes, such as municipal golf courses, parks,
and roadway plantings, have already been modified to
reduce water use. Thus, while outdoor watering would
certainly be restricted or perhaps banned, fewer readily
available means to reduce overall demand exist in the
Tucson AMA than in the Phoenix AMA.
27
Arizona Water Law and Policy
7.3.2. Potential Implications of a Severe Five- or 10-Year
Drought –Tucson AMA
If a repeat of the driest five-year period, which lasted
from 1900-1904, were to recur at 2025 population
levels, the cumulative impact would be an additional
241,993 af of groundwater pumping; non-renewable
water supplies would be required to meet 28 percent of
total demand, rather than the 15 percent projected in
the Tucson AMA’s Third Management Plan (ADWR
1999b). The same types of conservation initiatives as
suggested for Phoenix could—and probably would—
be enacted in the Tucson AMA. However, overall, the
Tucson AMA might actually experience less of an im-
pact from a drought of this duration, once the short-
term pumping capacity problem is resolved, since
groundwater supplies are sufficient to meet increased
demand within this time frame.
A drought beginning in 2025 that extended for a 10-
year period and included conditions similar to the
deepest 10-year drought in the historical record for the
local area, which occurred from 1947 through 1956,
would result in 380,687 af of additional groundwater
pumping. While the aquifer could support such condi-
tions for a time, it is highly likely that land subsidence
and reduced well production would result in some ar-
eas of the AMA. The Tucson AMA may also have less
potential to shift water consumption away from agri-
cultural uses and toward meeting municipal demands,
since the role of agriculture in the AMA has already
been steadily decreasing, a trend which is expected to
continue into the future: in 1995, agriculture ac-
counted for 42 percent of total water demand; by
2025, this proportion is expected to fall to 21 percent
(ADWR 1999b: 11-21).
As in the Phoenix AMA, severe sustained drought of
10 years or more duration would likely encourage pro-
viders to negotiate with farmers on leasing water. The
amount of potentially available water would be consid-
erable, especially if grandfathered and in-lieu supplies
were taken into account. Such arrangements would en-
tail construction of new infrastructure to get the water
from source to destination. Also, as in the case of the
Phoenix AMA, it is likely that local providers would
attempt to change the policy structure to facilitate in-
ter-basin water transfers. This water could be
“wheeled” down the CAP canal, and delivered to end
users through the systems of the providers linked to
the canal. Those providers not linked either to one of
these systems, or to the CAP canal itself, would not
benefit from these arrangements, and would likely
have little option except to intensify pumping and en-
courage greater conservation among their customers.
Given current ACC restrictions against passing the
cost of conservation programs on to customers
through rate changes, it is unclear how the scenarios
for these providers would play out over the long run.
In extreme cases, emergency deliveries of water via
tanker truck could be initiated, although these mea-
sures could only be sustained under emergency condi-
tions.
Ever since the CAP canal reached Tucson in 1992, the
pressure to utilize alternative renewable supplies has
been intense within the AMA. At the same time, a tur-
bulent history of resistance to direct use has unfolded.
In November 1992 the city’s largest water provider,
Tucson Water, began delivering CAP water to about
half of its customers. However, the different chemical
composition of the water proved to be incompatible
with the pipes of many older homes in the delivery
area. Customers were confronted with brown, foul-
smelling water that in some cases caused extensive
damage, including burst pipes and corroded appli-
ances. After nearly two years, the city council voted to
terminate CAP delivery and return to strictly using
groundwater. In 1995 city voters passed an initiative
that prohibited the city from delivering CAP water di-
rectly to homes. The initiative was strengthened by
voters in a subsequent election. However, in November
1999, voters defeated an initiative that would have
strengthened the initiative’s provisions even further. In
the wake of this election, the City of Tucson has un-
rolled plans, including the delivery of blended water
noted above, to fully utilize its 138,920 af allotment
(ADWR 1999b: 12-5). These steps will go a long way
to assuring that the total allotment of 215,333 af will
begin being used in ways that, over the long term, will
benefit the AMA. It remains to be seen, however, how
the new recharge/recovery and delivery policies and
procedures will buffer the impacts of severe sustained
drought across the AMA. Given current infrastructural
and institutional limitations, it is likely that outlying
areas of the AMA that are rapidly growing and far
from the CAP canal would be most affected by
drought stresses.
As discussed with regard to the Phoenix AMA, the wa-
ter systems in the Tucson AMA are very sensitive to
loss of CAP supplies, including reductions or cutoffs
prompted by severe sustained drought conditions.
Since today the Tucson AMA does not depend, to any
significant extent, on non-CAP surface water to meet
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demand, the effects of drought on groundwater sup-
plies are less visible; however, the long-term conse-
quences of decreased winter precipitation for main-
taining safe-yield are considerable. While preliminary
results of a survey carried out by the CLIMAS Urban
Water team indicate that water providers see them-
selves as fairly insulated from climate impacts, severe
sustained drought could pose significant challenges in
terms of increased energy costs, the need to find ways
to impel or persuade customers to decrease their water
use, and risk of land subsidence.
Interestingly, under normal (i.e., non-drought) cli-
matic conditions, overdraft could be eliminated if all
available CAP water and effluent were used efficiently,
instead of groundwater (ADWR 1999b: 12-1). The
Tucson AMA water budget for 2025 includes usage of
177,900 af of Tucson’s allotment of CAP water, thus
reducing reliance on mined groundwater from 70 per-
cent (in 1995) to 15 percent. By contrast, as noted ear-
lier in this working paper, the Phoenix AMA water
budget for 2025 shows a continued rise in overdraft.
Other measures, such as greater recharge of effluent,
are now becoming more widely used in both AMAs,
and also contribute to reducing overdraft conditions.
The shift to CAP water is expected to double the renew-
able water supply in the Tucson AMA during the next
25 years. Over the same time period, the population of
the Tucson AMA is projected to increase by 40 percent.
This rate of population growth is similar to Phoenix’s 43
percent growth rate, although the actual additional
numbers are much smaller: 498,500 additional people
in Tucson AMA, as opposed to 1,932,947 more resi-
dents in Phoenix.
Under normal conditions, as noted above, the Tucson
AMA’s increased reliance on CAP supplies will clearly
ease the overdraft situation. However, a long-term,
widespread drought would have impacts similar to those
detailed above for the Phoenix AMA. The most readily
available strategy, apart from increasing the stringency of
conservation rules, would be to develop policies and
pricing mechanisms that would encourage, or perhaps
even require, the transfer of agricultural water and/or
water rights to urban water providers and users.
Many of the same mechanisms available to the Phoe-
nix AMA for coping with severe sustained droughts,
under conditions of a significantly higher demand,
would be similar for the Tucson AMA. However, a few
unique characteristics of the Tucson AMA could have
bearing on community acceptance of policy changes.
Water users in the Tucson AMA have a rather long his-
tory of controversy over water issues. Distrust of pro-
fessional water managers and providers remains high,
and an extended severe drought would surely bring
longstanding issues back into the foreground. Long-
time local residents recall events such as the ouster of
the mayor and council in the 1970s in response to an
attempted water rate hike. Further, the controversy
over direct delivery of CAP water led to the formation
of several citizens’ groups focusing on water supply and
demand issues. While public discourse on these issues
is currently muted, direct delivery of CAP water re-
mains a point of contention. Much of this latent resis-
tance may be attributed to the fact that Tucson has a
particularly visible activist community that is con-
cerned with long-term sustainability issues, including
greater water conservation through use of residential
gray water and effluent and low water use landscaping.
Through their efforts, as well as through the influence
of early adoption of desert landscapes by homeowners
in some of the wealthier areas of the city, xeriscaping is
now common throughout the community.
Tucson residents, representing a range of environmen-
tal and political positions, regularly question the wis-
dom of relying on CAP supplies. Arguments center on
one or both of two issues: there is no guarantee that
CAP supplies are secure; and use of Colorado River
water has already severely damaged the once-thriving
Colorado River Delta and Gulf of California ecosys-
tems. Although generalizing about community atti-
tudes is risky at the best of times, analysis of events and
discourses suggests that broadly based efforts to resolve
the community’s concerns in a manner that fairly dis-
tributes the costs and benefits of water use among the
various sectors, including ecosystem demands, could
go a long way toward averting the worst impacts of se-
vere sustained drought.
Such efforts, however, cannot be restricted solely to a
single AMA. Among the issues that must also be ad-
dressed are interjurisdictional barriers, including lack
of a comprehensive vision and of trust between indi-
vidual water interest groups. This was cited as a signifi-
cant problem in the Tucson AMA’s Third Management
Plan, for example (ADWR 1999b). The lack of strong
regulation over either surface or groundwater outside
AMA boundaries can pose problems as well, particu-
larly given the current growth trends in areas adjacent
but external to the AMA boundaries. Likewise, numer-
ous questions remain with regard to how water would
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be moved from where it exists as “wet water” to where
it is needed. In some cases, the issues are institutional
in nature; for example, it is unclear what rules would
be involved (or required) to wheel non-CAP water
down the CAP canal. Related to this is the question of
what sorts of conditions would be considered suffi-
ciently dire to effect a lifting of the restriction on inter-
basin water transfers. Further, in some situations, lack
of infrastructure continues to pose a considerable bar-
rier to moving water from one place to another. In this
case, the unanswered question revolves around what
sorts of measures would be required to address this
shortcoming. Whose needs could be satisfied through
expensive infrastructure development, and whose
would be addressed (perhaps through trucked-in wa-
ter) only during extreme emergency? The lack of a
state-level drought contingency plan contributes to the
high level of uncertainty about how drought impacts
would—or should—be managed.
Lack of effective communication to the public regard-
ing the nature of the state’s water-related issues consti-
tutes a further problem. Visible threats to water sup-
plies, such as a severe, long-term drought, would likely
spur the public into being more receptive toward con-
servation measures. However, even the worst decadal
drought in the historical record, that of the 1950s, in-
cluded years when precipitation was relatively close to
normal. Maintaining public commitment to stringent
conservation measures would surely be difficult during
those times when short-term weather conditions con-
tradict longer-term drought assessments. An additional
challenge to sustaining conservation behavior arises
with regard to the lag time between the onset and con-
clusion of drought conditions and the environmental
impacts of the drought, for drought impacts typically
lag behind onset of a climatological drought, and per-
sist after the climatological drought has abated. Con-
vincing water users that they must severely curtail wa-
ter use when precipitation is communicated as being at
(or above) normal is certain to become increasingly
difficult. The challenge for water regulators and for the
climate forecasting community is to develop effective,
persuasive narratives about the relationships between
long-term and short-term conditions and processes to
stakeholders and the general public.
8. Conclusions
Arizona has a reasonably well developed structure of
policies and institutions for governing water manage-
ment within the central portion of the state. Overall,
this web of regulations provides a basis for balancing
natural systems of climate and ecology with human
factors of rapid population growth and increasing wa-
ter demand. However, the institutional foundation in
the state is based on a relatively narrow
conceptualization of climate variability, and thus is a
source of potentially serious constraint to effective wa-
ter management in times of climatic stress. Some of
the existing institutions and policies, especially those
addressing water rights, water storage and recovery, in-
terstate and intrastate water marketing, water transfer,
and consumer pricing, need to be broadened in scope
and authority to manage water resources effectively
under conditions of severe stress.
The state needs to develop a comprehensive drought
contingency plan, one that recognizes the potential for
deep, sustained drought of at least the magnitude of
the 1950s decade-long dry period. This plan should be
statewide, and should place a special emphasis on bal-
ancing “business as usual” demands in receiving re-
gions with equity issues in the source regions from
which supplemental water would be acquired. Also
needed is a focused public education effort to bring
consumers as well as water managers up to speed on
the implications of climate variability. Greater commu-
nication with the public is likewise needed with regard
to existing and potential weaknesses in water institu-
tions and physical systems with regard to coping with
the impacts of multiple stresses (climate, demand
growth, depletion of supplies, disparities between
where water is available and where it is needed, and
other such stressors).
The existing institutional framework for water man-
agement in the AMAs has to date succeeded reasonably
well in buffering residents from the vicissitudes of cli-
mate and hydrology. For the future, however, competi-
tion over water is very likely to escalate, brought on by
increased demand associated with rapid urban growth.
Pressures to allocate water, for example, to instream
and ecosystem uses, Native American water rights, and
federal reserved water rights must also be considered. A
comprehensive review of policy and decision making
processes, one which takes climate variability into ac-
count, is essential to planning for and responding to
stresses on water resources. Development of mecha-
nisms to assure effective dissemination and use of cli-
mate forecasts and other types of climate information,
including efforts currently underway within CLIMAS
and within NOAA more generally hold promise for
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contributing to decision making processes. A subse-
quent CLIMAS analysis will address in more detail po-
tential changes to institutional arrangements, together
with more comprehensive use of climate information
and forecasts, that could enhance resilience and coping
capacity among water managers and decision makers.
Endnotes
1 Active Management Areas (AMAs) were designated
by the Arizona Department of Water Resources in
1980 as part of the Groundwater Management Act to
regulate groundwater withdrawals in areas of the state
experiencing rapid declines in water table levels.
2 Due to the Colorado River’s potential as a flash point
for interstate conflicts, several in-depth analyses have
been conducted on this highly developed source of wa-
ter (see, e.g., The Powell Consortium 1995; Pontius
1997; Arizona Water Banking Authority 1998).
3 Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, 3
U.N.T.S. 313 (effective Nov. 8, 1945)
4 Institutional changes included (a) adoption of a “re-
verse equalization rule” that would maintain similar wa-
ter levels in both Lake Mead and Lake Powell (current
rules call for more water to be stored in Mead, even if at
the expense of Powell); (b) temporarily ignoring the de-
livery obligation of the Upper Basin to the Lower basin,
so as to equalize the burden of the drought; (c) revising
reservoir operating rules to allow storage of water in
headwater reservoirs for as long as possible, thus minimiz-
ing losses from evaporation; and (d) allowing interstate
water banking and marketing to the extent that no harm
would come to the other states from the transactions.
5 Ironically, pumping by the Fort Huachua Military
Reservation may be protected under federal reserve
rights regulations, just as the San Pedro National Con-
servation Area would be. Other local and national en-
vironmental groups such as The Southwest Center for
Biological Diversity, The Nature Conservancy, and
Friends of the San Pedro are also involved in efforts to
preserve this remnant vestige of riparian habitat in the
American Southwest.
6 Recent estimates indicate that newly imposed federal
water quality rules will cost Nogales, Arizona an addi-
tional $3 million per year to meet the higher standards
(Holub 2001).
7 The maximum amount that MWD would have to
forego, however, would be 500,000 af.
8 Again, the maximum required reduction expected of
MWD would be capped at 500,000 af per year. The
obligation to reduce use would occur whenever the
earliest of one of the following occurs: (a) the total
amount foregone to benefit Arizona reaches 1 maf, (b)
the Secretary makes a flood control release during any
year in the 15-year interim period, or (c) MWD and
ADWR agree on an alterative shortage reparation that
explicitly terminates MWD’s obligation.
9 It is worth noting here that the new 30-year period
for operational weather and climate forecasting reflects
warmer temperatures than the temperatures used to
determine climate averages at the time the Groundwa-
ter Code was written. Thus, assumptions used in de-
veloping water supply and demand estimates may be
based on data that underestimate critical parameters
such as evapotranspiration rates.
10 Some, including former Secretary of the Interior and
former governor of Arizona, Bruce Babbitt, have called
for an AMA to be created in the Sierra Vista-area
groundwater basin; local residents remain strongly op-
posed to this institutional change.
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